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Abstract: Lévy-Bruhl’s thought, on the verge between philosophy and anthropology, reappears, 
misunderstood and underestimated, after nearly a century of neglect. This article intends  to start  his 
rehearsal in the history of his reception and the author marks out some guidelines for a reading based on 
the one given by Emmanuel Levinas in an essay dated 1957, Lévy-Bruhl and contemporary philosophy. 
According to Levinas, who had been a pupil in Strasburg of Lévy-Bruhl’s students, in every page of the lonely 
writer of the Carnets we find the sketch of a new theory about human origin that escapes  Structuralism and 
places in a still unexplored perspective concepts such as conscience, language and social membership. The 
Greek formalization of human experience that Durkheim did not wished to question had become by then, 
according to Lévy-Bruhl, too narrow, perhaps we could say too naive to be able to hold the phenomenology 
of the existence of those other populations, that ethnographers still referred to Europe. The datum of 
the plurivocity of mental activity, joined to the requirement of the universality of logic thought, meant 
for Lévy-Bruhl the need of crossing the bonds of the issues of classical philosophy in the same direction 
where Husserl, in the same years, was proceeding with a new search of essences. The article considers 
the political and historical situation Lévy-Bruhl worked in and, thanks to some recent studies, in particular 
those of Dominique Merllié and Frédéric Keck, it analyses the background of the progressive distortion and 
alienation of his theories in France and in the rest of the world. Using Emmanuel Levinas’s hints as guide 
we proceed then to a survey in the implications of the idea of participation, especially for what concerns a 
possible re-formulation of the concept of the Unconscious.
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Resumo: Pensamento de Lévy-Bruhl, à beira entre a filosofia ea antropologia, reaparece, incompreendido 
e subestimado, depois de quase um século de negligência. Este artigo pretende iniciar o seu ensaio na 
história de sua recepção eo autor assinala algumas orientações para uma leitura com base no que foi 
dada por Emmanuel Levinas em um ensaio datado de 1957, Lévy-Bruhl ea filosofia contemporânea. De 
acordo com Levinas, que tinha sido um aluno em Strasburg de estudantes Lévy-Bruhl, em todas as páginas 
do escritor solitário das cadernetas encontramos o esboço de uma nova teoria sobre a origem humana 
que escapa Estruturalismo e lugares em alguns conceitos de perspectiva ainda inexploradas tais como 
membro linguagem, consciência e social. A formalização grega da experiência humana que Durkheim 
não quis questão tornou-se então, de acordo com Lévy-Bruhl, muito estreito, talvez pudéssemos dizer 
muito ingênuo para ser capaz de segurar a fenomenologia da existência dessas outras populações, que os 
etnógrafos ainda se refere à Europa. O dado da plurivocidade da atividade mental, juntou-se à exigência 
de universalidade do pensamento lógico, destinado a Lévy-Bruhl a necessidade de cruzar as ligações dos 
problemas da filosofia clássica na mesma direção em que Husserl, nos mesmos anos, foi prosseguir com 
uma nova pesquisa das essências. O artigo considera a situação política e histórica Lévy-Bruhl trabalhou 
na e, graças a alguns estudos recentes, em particular as de Dominique Merllié e Keck Frédéric, analisa 
o fundo da distorção progressiva e alienação de suas teorias na França e no resto do mundo. Usando 
referências de Emmanuel Levinas como guia, em seguida, proceder a um levantamento nas implicações 
da idéia de participação, especialmente para o que diz respeito a uma possível reformulação do conceito 
de Inconsciente.
Palavras-chave: Lévy Bruhl. Emmanuel Levinas. Participação. Inconsciente.
Resumen: Pensamiento de Lévy-Bruhl,  el borde entre la filosofía y la antropología, reaparece de nuevo, 
incomprendido y subestimado, después de casi un siglo de abandono. Este artículo tiene la intención de 
iniciar su ensayo en la historia de su recepción y el autor muestra algunas pautas para una lectura con  base 
en la dada por Emmanuel Levinas, en un ensayo del año 1957, Lévy-Bruhl y la filosofía contemporánea. 
Según Levinas, quien había sido discípulo de Estrasburgo de los estudiantes de Lévy-Bruhl, en todas las 
páginas del escritor solitario de los diarios nos encontramos con el esbozo de una nueva teoría sobre el origen 
humano que  escapa del estructuralismo y de los lugares en los conceptos de perspectiva aún inexplorados 
tales como los miembros de la conciencia, el lenguaje y lo social. La formalización griega de la experiencia 
humana  que Durkheim no hizo cuestión  y se  volvió entonces, según Lévy-Bruhl,  demasiado ingenuo para 
ser capaz de mantener la fenomenología de la existencia de esas otras poblaciones, que "los etnógrafos 
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todavía se refieren a Europa. El dato de la plurivocidad de la actividad mental, se unió a la exigencia de la 
universalidad del pensamiento lógico, destinado a Lévy-Bruhl la necesidad de cruzar los lazos de los temas 
de la filosofía clásica en la misma dirección en que Husserl, en los mismos años, fue continuando con la 
búsqueda de nuevas pesquisas  de las esencias. El artículo considera que la situación política e histórica 
de Lévy-Bruhl, gracias a algunos estudios recientes, en particular los de Merllié Dominique y Frédéric 
Keck, que analiza el fondo de la distorsión progresiva y la alienación de sus teorías en Francia y en el resto 
del mundo. Utilizando  las referencias de Emmanuel Levinas como  guía a continuación, se procede a un 
estudio en las implicaciones de la idea de la participación, especialmente por lo que se refiere a la posible 
reformulación del concepto del inconsciente.
Palabras clave: Lévy Bruhl. Emmanuel Levinas. Participación. Inconsciente.
 
his participation in the struggle of French social-
ism was steady and intense and he remained 
alongside Jean Jaurès from school until the day 
when the latter was assassinated on 31st July 
1914. Together with Marcel Mauss, Léon Blum 
and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl Herr, he helped to es-
tablish the magazine «L 'Humanité», for which 
he wrote under the pseudonym Deuzelle (the 
two L of Lucien Lévy); he mobilized every re-
source in the Dreyfus affair, testifying person-
ally at the trail and he wrote important articles 
in order to oppose the first world war5. Member 
of the Cabinet of his old pupil Albert Thomas at 
the Undersecretariat and then Ministry for Am-
munition, from 1914 he accompanied several 
times at the front the syndicalist Ben Tillet as 
interpreter to visit British soldiers6. His social 
commitment was not for Europe only: from 
1925 with Mauss and Paul Rivet he managed 
the Institute of Ethnology founded by Maurice 
Delafosse, strenuously defending an Ethnology 
method on field that respected the rights of 
the populations concerned. For this purpose in 
the latter part of his life, despite his advanced 
age, he engaged in a series of conferences that 
led him to travel around the world.
This interest without respite in the events 
of his time is nothing more than the corollary 
of his theoretical work because he was per-
suaded, as Auguste Comte, of whom he aimed 
to collect the inheritance7, that a real and deci-
sive contribution to the history of ideas has to 
take into account the link between intellectual 
and social battle. It was as tribute to both his 
commitments, and therefore to the meaning 
of his philosophical project, that at his death 
13th March 1939 the whole French culture with 
its exponents, no matter how close or distant 
from his positions8, paid him the honors due 
to a Dean.
His old pupils recognized themselves in 
him, celebrating his friendship and radical intel-
lectual honesty9 in the funeral oration and then 
distinguishing themselves in the French culture 
1 INTRODUÇÃO
The representation is not 
the original gesture
of human soul, but a choice.
Emmanuel Levinas
In 1930 Hélène Metzger wrote for the 
magazine «Archeion» a short article entitled 
Lévy-Bruhl’s philosophy and the history of 
science, where she presented the work of 
Lucien Lévy-Bruhl with these words: 
We believe that it is capable of fully renewing our 
conception of human intelligence. So as chemists dis-
covered helium in the sun before discovering it on 
Earth, the author, by studying the Savages, with a 
long and unexpected detour, laid stress on a steady 
effect of the proceedings of our thinking that until 
then had escaped even the most farsighted psycholo-
gists (METZGER, 1987, p. 125)1.
A whole generation of French thinkers, 
formed by Lévy-Bruhl in the Sorbonne during 
the decades of his teaching would certain-
ly have approved the opinion of Metzger at 
that time, as our work will try to clarify, since 
Lévy-Bruhl, philosopher and anthropologist, 
or better said, anthropologist because philos-
opher2, Director of the Revue Philosophique 
and designated by Théodule Ribot as his heir, 
was famous in Europe in those years like Ein-
stein and Freud and in France he enjoyed an 
unquestionable intellectual prestige. He stood 
out immediately for the early development of 
his brilliant intelligence3 at the École Normale 
and then continued his career at the Univer-
sity at the Faculty of Philosophy along with 
his friends of nearly the same age Émile Dur-
kheim, Jean Jaurès and Henri Bergson assert-
ing himself immediately as authoritative voice 
in the convulsive fervor that prompted French 
culture at a time when the legacy of the Revo-
lution now settled placed social issues before 
unimaginable.
His involvement in the history of the third 
Republic was such that you could write a politi-
cal profile of Lévy-Bruhl as well: born 10th April 
1857 in Paris from an Alsatian Jewish family4 
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as innovators: Étienne Gilson10, Maurice Halb-
wachs, Georges Davy, Henri Wallon, Charles 
Blondel, Maurice Leenardh and Jacques Marit-
ain, to cite only the most famous ones alongside 
with his son Henri Lévy-Bruhl. The founders of 
new schools such as Jean Piaget11 and Edward 
Evans-Pritchard12 claimed to be inspired by 
him; even Durkheim's sociological school, 
headed by Mauss after the death of the latter, 
while it envisaged him as dissident, put him 
among its founders all the same. In the light 
of his reflection on mentality, Lucien Febvre 
together with Marc Bloch began in Strasbourg 
that extraordinary subversion of historiography 
represented by l'École des Annales to which a 
historian sui generis like Philippe Ariès (1971) 
was very close; he developed the idea of men-
tality gathering with acuteness from the prov-
ocations of Lévy-Bruhl. The history of science 
found in his work a lot of essential stimuli to 
its development: Émile Meyerson was one of 
his most enthusiastic partisans and Alexandre 
Koyré (1945, p. 292-293), with words that we 
will try to clarify later on in these pages, could 
declare that it was:
a wonderful analysis of this prelogical mentality  […] 
and of the magic ontology in which it bathes and from 
which, with great difficulty, and only at times come to 
detach themselves the «logic» thought  and rational 
ontology. And they remind us that in many respects 
we are all, just as we are, prelogical primitives13.
2 THE “INCIDENT” LÉVY-BRUHL
However, from March 1939 until today14, 
inexplicably, the results of the researches of 
Lévy-Bruhl and the influences they had on his 
contemporaries and many disciples were aban-
doned in the best hypothesis by the history 
of cognitive sciences; therefore it is not easy 
to find reliable sources unless you engage in 
lengthy searches: in France as in the rest of 
the world he is considered a minor character 
and his theories are deemed an outdated and 
insignificant stage in the history of anthropol-
ogy. In the worst and most frequent hypoth-
esis his concepts are cited by divulgers in a 
distorted and incomplete way: as Dominique 
Merllié pointed out, who first paid attention to 
this issue15, very few are the compendiums of 
human sciences, encyclopedias16, glossaries, 
in which the public can discover authentic in-
formation regarding the theses of Lévy-Bruhl, 
and it frequently happens to find accounts that 
state almost the opposite of the historical truth 
that, on the other hand, documents, and above 
all his published books testify without ambigu-
ity. It is sad, for example, to thus read in a 
magazine addressed to an African audience:
It is the honor of the French Ethnologist Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl, to have conferred dignity to the scientific com-
mon places of European ethnocentrism […]. In the se-
ries of ethnological essays starting with Les Fonctions 
Mentales dans les societies inferieures (published in 
1910), until La Mentalité Primitive (work published in 
1922 and generally regarded as his magnum opus), 
Lévy-Bruhl persisted in providing a scientific security 
to the detachment between Western man and the 
rest of humanity by proposing the term of “prelogical 
mentality” to define a way of thinking that he attrib-
uted to people and to non-Western breeds. According 
to Lévy-Bruhl, logic was the prerogative of the white 
man, closely associated with the Western civilization; 
in his opinion it was therefore barred by necessity 
to cultures developed outside this civilization. Racial 
evolution so construed by Lévy-Bruhl was intended to 
establish a radical disparity between the West and the 
rest of humanity, even to the level of mental opera-
tions. (ABIOLA IRELE, 2002, p. 83-106)17.
How we shall easily find out thanks to 
our tough synthetic examination of his texts18 
allowed here, the image of Lévy-Bruhl painted 
in this essay cannot coincide with what a 
careful reader will remember after reading his 
pages, in which the concern of not nourishing 
in any way the ethnocentrism of many of his 
colleagues occupied the first place19. It is possi-
ble therefore that the reputation of Lévy-Bruhl 
has become so bad that no author considers 
it necessary to read his writings before men-
tioning them, contenting themselves instead 
of repeating uncritically a kind of black legend 
concerning his figure?
The issue is certainly mysterious and de-
serves further study. Certainly, as Merllié 
states, the ostracism of Levi-Strauss, Mauss 
heir and thus heir of the Durkheimian school, 
played a big role in his progressive discredit, 
for as we shall soon see Lévy-Bruhl had de-
tached himself from them, elegantly and firmly 
asserting his autonomy of thought. No doubt 
the disdain of Sartre20, who, after an initial en-
thusiasm felt that every conclusion reached by 
the research of Levy-Bruhl was irrelevant to 
the rest of his philosophy helped to transform 
him into a dark and marginal thinker. Undeni-
ably the courage with which Sartre performed 
a self-critique at the end of his life, which will 
be discussed in more detail later, seemed to 
the eyes of his detractors an unpardonable 
weakness, and unquestionably his poor bent 
to leadership was not in his favor in compari-
son with Durkheim. Yet this is not enough to 
explain such an ensemble and refusal to accept 
the indisputable transparency of his exposition 
in every published page21, denying to listen 
to the explanations that he affirms, discour-
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aged, in a page of the Carnets to have lasted 
thirty years (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, p. 164). Ac-
cording to ourselves only Emmanuel Levinas 
was authentically able to guess the purpose 
that crosses the works of Levy-Bruhl, so as 
we shall soon see, we shall adopt a Levinas-
sian lens for the rest of our work to find out 
what we thought the innermost reason of the 
curse that hit Levy-Bruhl for nearly a century 
now. Perhaps it is at stake in this “curse”, as 
defined by Merllié, another cause as well as all 
those listed above. A more hidden one inher-
ent to the deepest dimension of the writing of 
Levy-Bruhl.
3 MENS NON OMNIBUS UNA,  
NEC DIVERSA TAMEN
If we plunge ourselves in the reading of 
his writings without fear of the taboo that sur-
rounds them we realize that his prose so accu-
rate and enjoyable tracks, increasingly accurate 
for each of his essays, the lines of a new form 
of mind, that just starting from his unyield-
ing positivist faith finds at the bottom of every 
concept employed the torment of an elusive 
strangeness, and therefore forbids every claim 
of systematization on the cognitive world of 
human beings to the dialectical reason. Since 
the beginning of his research he stated that 
the study of rites and superstitions, customs 
relating to marriage, initiation of “inferior so-
cieties”, introduces us to forms of imagination, 
and even combination of judgment and rea-
soning that our psychology completely ignores. 
Yet he never agreed to relegate these psychic 
structures in an impasse of evolution, consid-
ering them a challenge to our representative 
logic, according to a principle of method that 
is summarized in a syllogism extremely im-
mediate. If the Primitives are humans, that of 
which Lévy-Bruhl was persuaded without any 
distinction22, and if their logic is actually dif-
ferent from ours, then they show us a hidden 
face of our own logic and put a question un-
fathomable and inescapable about ourselves. 
This is mainly what Durkheim and his school 
were unable to accept, and refused to hand 
down: the aporetic knot that emerges where 
Lévy-Bruhl claimed the dizzying possibility of 
a logical ambiguity rooted in the human mind. 
Inherent ambiguity23, for which all attempts 
to timely exposure become paradox, and it is 
emblematic in this sense, the maxim that Paul 
Landowski imprinted on a medal engraved for 
Lévy-Bruhl in 1937: mens non omnibus una, 
nec diversa tamen24. This maxim should sum 
up the theoretical gain that the philosopher 
of Mentalité primitive offered to the history 
of human sciences: his project unfolds in the 
space of this tamen, who becomes a sort of 
stop, to whose breaking strength pure reason 
must submit.
According to Lévy-Bruhl (1970, p. 69) in 
fact “the Primitives see with our own eyes – 
do not perceive with our own intelligence”. The 
pause that interrupts this phrase, adversative 
and explanatory together, insinuates a divi-
sion in the categorical universe thus depriv-
ing it of power that empties legislative reason 
from its ambition to provide a complete formal 
definition of human cognitive processes. In the 
perspective of Lévy-Bruhl certainly no kind of 
idealism can take a look at the psychic life in 
a way to express it in its completion, but the 
pause in a.m. maxim is not deconstructive 
only, it is not a retreat of thought that gives up 
seeking one semantics for the intellectual life 
of all human beings: una mens, indeed. It is a 
suspension that crops white space again, as if 
it was the opening of a threshold: the thresh-
old of a new heuristic model that draws in the 
map of things made by the human intelligence 
the simultaneity of two spirits ever present 
that perceive and between them the spiritual 
entity must conquer his own identity that is 
not given already. How can Lévy-Bruhl support 
a thesis like this?
15th February 1923 during the speech pro-
nounced for the meeting of the philosophical 
society that was requesting him to state pub-
licly the conclusions he had reached in La Men-
talité Primitive, he mentions
the facts observed in a large number of inferior so-
cieties, for example: 1st the common characteristics 
of the vocabulary and structure of their languages, 
although different between them. 2nd their num-
bering proceedings. 3rd their aversion to discursive 
operations of the mind, and the concrete nature of 
their generalizations. 4th their indifference to second 
causes and their immediate application, under all cir-
cumstances, to mystical causes. 5th the importance 
that the "Primitives" attach to divination, in all its 
forms. 6th their interpretation of accidents, misfor-
tunes, prodigious facts, “bad death”. 7th their miso-
neism, etc. (LEVY-BRUHL, 1923, p. 633).25
And immediately below he draws the fol-
lowing conclusions:
without prolonging this enumeration, it seems that 
the analysis of the facts confirms the hypothesis that 
primitive mentality has its own orientation and  hab-
its. Neither space nor time, nor causality would be it 
what they are for us. In short, for this mystical and 
prelogical mentality, not only the content but the very 
paradigms of experience do not seem to coincide ex-
actly with our own (LEVY-BRUHL, 1923, p. 633).
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His statement that the Primitives do not 
perceive with our own intelligence begins then 
to clear: it is an intellectual structure arising 
from different mental habits, in all their com-
plexity, what distinguishes them from us, from 
the mindset of “the adult and civilized white 
man”26, as modeled on the ideal of Greek logos. 
The thesis of Lévy-Bruhl is oriented in the 
same direction of what Mauss claimed about 
mana: “[…] it goes without saying that such a 
notion has no reason to exist outside society, 
that it is absurd from the point of view of pure 
reason, and that it flows solely from the opera-
tion of collective life”27 (MAUSS, 1965). Both 
Lévy-Bruhl and Mauss stress the evidence of 
an actual categorical heterogeneity between 
primitive logic and our own, which invests the 
fundamental cognitive functions such as space, 
time and causality; their lack of homogeneity 
in them and in ourselves pushes us to con-
sider “absurd” notions that play a central role 
in their mental organization.
However, Lévy-Bruhl attaches to the dif-
ference between the two mentalities a value 
that transcends what importance Mauss was 
conferring, even defending like him the thesis 
that the primitive mentality gravitates exclu-
sively in the circle of collective representation. 
He writes at the margin of Bergson’s reflection 
about the cognitive function of time:
Bergson's well-known theory which requires us to 
conceive of time as a homogeneous quantum by fus-
ing living duration and space, which is such a quan-
tum, does not seem applicable to primitive mental-
ity. It is only in races which are already somewhat 
developed, when the mystic preconnections become 
weak and tend to be dissociated, when the habit of 
paying attention to second causes and their effects is 
growing stronger, that space becomes homogeneous 
in the representations, and time tends to become so 
too. Thus the limits of our experience are sketched 
little by little, are strengthened and become fixed. 
Much later, when reflection leads us to make these 
ideas our own, we are tempted to believe that they 
are its constituent elements—innate, as the philoso-
phers used to say. The observation and analysis of 
the collective representations of inferior races are far 
from confirming this hypothesis. (LEVY-BRUHL, 1966, 
p. 83).
It seems to me that in this passage there 
is a key essential to grasp the radicalism of the 
prospect of Lévy-Bruhl, and therefore to get 
closer to the nature of the difference between 
the two mentalities as he intended it: it is le-
gitimate, he states, to confirm or deny a hy-
pothesis about “our” notion of time through 
the use of Primitive experience.
The majority of the false notions circulat-
ing about the books of Lévy-Bruhl concern the 
fact that he postulated an unbridgeable gap 
between the mentality of primitives and ours. 
According to some, as we saw above, he would 
have done so in a shameless ethnocentric per-
spective, according to others, more benevo-
lent, his emphasis on the distance between 
the primitive and the white man would have 
been moved by a naive presumption to better 
guarantee their singularity to Primitives, 
except for withdrawing everything in the draft 
of the Carnets, when the tide of anti-Semitism 
showed that non including relativism could 
imply mortal perils for the minorities consid-
ered radically separated.
However, from what we read on the concept 
of time we discover something completely dif-
ferent: the passage just quoted shows that 
these rumors are not true, that these are only 
superficial interpretations incapable to grasp 
the real purpose of Lévy-Bruhl when he pointed 
out the differences between the mentality of 
the so-called inferior societies and the mental-
ity of “civilized” people.  First of all from his 
words it is clear that he first thought that phil-
osophical inquiry, in this case that of Bergson, 
must  understand as its subject the existence 
of “Savages” of humans at ethnological level, 
and question them as privileged witnesses of 
humanity if he wants to achieve a genuine in-
crease in the penetration of human experience, 
if it wishes to strive towards the revelation of 
one essence able to discern the true nature 
of the human: “their” experience rises to the 
rank of touchstone in the verification of the 
logical validity of Bergson’s thesis about space 
and time, the most primary coordinate of each 
psychic subject. Lévy-Bruhl, wrote this in 1922, 
in an epoch when “Savages” were considered 
by the majority of Europeans merely as subhu-
man beings or not yet humans.
Lévy-Bruhl invented the term and concept 
of mentality, which Durkheim and Mauss 
always regarded with distrust, but that has 
since become common in every language. In 
the concept of mentality Lévy-Bruhl defines 
the coordinates of space in which he places its 
investigation and Bruno Karsenti, in present-
ing the latest edition of the Carnets describes 
them with great effectiveness. First, says 
Karsenti, the idea of mentality is founded on 
a persuasion that Lévy-Bruhl shares with the 
durkheimian school:
Tylor, Frazer and Lang based their analysis on that 
axiom that human intelligence is everywhere and al-
ways identical to itself, so that it is always possible 
to explain its different manifestations, dating back 
to the principles that define this identity. What the 
French sociological school, in the path traced by Dur-
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kheim, has the merit to establish is that the group, in 
its specific morphology, acts as a differentiator that 
comes to affect even forms of intelligence. […] To put 
it differently, it is necessary to proceed in this field, as 
well according to a comparative method. (KARSENTI, 
1998, p. XI).
Secondly, and this is the specificity of his 
theory that will detach him  gradually from the 
durkheimian orthodoxy, Lévy-Bruhl, supports 
a second argument, describing in detail  the 
notion of mentality, according to which:
There is no possibility of comparison if not 
on the basis of a separation. Again: the fact of 
not reducing the sets of collective representa-
tions to a single type lead to consider these 
collections as distinct types. […] Collective 
representations should be considered in their 
difference, and to the extent that they aggre-
gate in units of different types, i.e. different 
mentalities […]. The purpose is therefore pri-
marily to draw a line intended to prevent any 
reductionism (KARSENTI, 1998, p. XI).
It is the singularity of each human group 
and human groups of different ages, that 
Lévy-Bruhl intends therefore to preserve, in 
a theoretical commitment that appears really 
extraordinary within the scientific community 
of the period in which he conducted his own 
researches. The goal of “the difficult position 
of Lévy-Bruhl, namely that the plurality comes 
to determine every mind, and that the unit is, 
at every point an illusion” (KARSENTI, 1998, 
p. VII), is not equivalent to preach a sort of 
ethnological relativism, because in wondering 
if “thinking is not an operation essentially alien 
to itself, multiple in itself” (KARSENTI, 1998, p. 
VII), Lévy-Bruhl did not sought to question the 
unity of the human mind and thus the identical 
dignity of all people, regardless of their par-
ticular mentality. Yet with the utmost lucidity 
Karsenti says:
To admit the diversity of channels that logic assumes 
is not denying its unity, in the same way that talking 
about Primitives is not equivalent to break down the 
concept of humanity. Actually we have to think in re-
verse. The fact that a reality presents itself under the 
appearance of diversity commits us to look for its rea-
sons at a level where only an analysis focused on the 
element of difference is able to make it re-emerge. 
(KARSENTI, 1998, p. XIII).
Lévy-Bruhl, Karsenti states, “thus acting 
reached a level of mental reality hitherto 
concealed, and was in a position to unveil the 
deepest aspects of the logic process without 
erasing their plurivalence. […] the thesis of 
the unity of the spirit was discussed only to 
be re-established on another plane, in which 
the distinction of its modes of activity becomes 
conceivable” (KARSENTI, 1998, p. XIV). It 
seems to us that this reading of Karsenti is 
supported by every work of Lévy-Bruhl, and 
we therefore wonder how can the latter have 
dared to take a road so innovative and solitary 
in the scene of anthropology that was emerging 
in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century?
4 A CHOICE PRIOR TO ALL LOGIC 
In 1957 Emmanuel Levinas in an article28 
written for the monographic number of the 
Revue Philosophique dedicated to Lévy-Bruhl 
gave an answer to this question which we feel 
is the best ever given, although this reply is 
mostly unknown as well or barely acknowledged 
by the divulgers of the anthropology of Lévy-
Bruhl. Moving from a close confrontation with 
the text of whom had been the master of his 
masters, Levinas came to show that identifying, 
analyzing and demonstrating the possibility of 
two different logical dimensions in the human 
psyche Lévy-Bruhl brought his personal 
contribution to the philosophical studies in 
which the European philosophy of the time was 
engaged. According to Levinas, the discovery of 
primitive mentality fulfils the aim of Lévy-Bruhl 
to understand how we really know29 and from 
his point of view searching for the authenticity 
of human knowledge Lévy-Bruhl assigns a 
particular primacy to primitive logic: If we are 
not satisfied with the epistemological process 
as described by Western philosophy over the 
centuries, we realize that “the movement 
towards the object rests upon a deeper motion 
that is more visible in the primitive mentality 
than in ours” (LEVINAS, 1957, p. 568). Levinas 
quotes in support of his reading of Lévy-Bruhl 
some passages of the Carnets, in particular 
he refers to some passages in the Carnets 
which shows clearly that in the perspective of 
the latter “there is a mystical mentality more 
evident and more easily observable by the 
«Primitives» than in our society, but present 
in every human mind” (LEVY-BRUHL, 1998, p. 
131). Further, more explicitly:
I do not maintain […] that there is a mentality owned 
by “Primitives”. There is in their mentality a consid-
erable part that is in common with ours. In parallel 
there is in the mentality of our society a part (more 
or less conspicuous, depending on conditions, beliefs, 
institutions, social classes, etc.), which is common 
for it to the “Primitives”. You may, for convenience 
of exposition, detach this part from the rest, and in 
order to describe and analyze it more easily, prefer to 
consider it in the “Savages”, retaining for it the des-
ignation of primitive mentality, but being fully aware 
that it is something human that you meet not only in 
these primitive societies, but in the others as well. 
(LEVY-BRUHL, 1998, p. 165).
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Studying primitive mentality means for 
Lévy-Bruhl to finally reveal how humans know, 
because only in the experience of the Prim-
itives we can meet our own humanity in its 
original virtual duplicity and therefore we can 
see deep inside ourselves30 looking at them 
as in a mirror. Levinas looking into what we 
thought to be the most subversive principle of 
the method by which Lévy-Bruhl approached 
the existence of the Primitives, finds its foun-
dation in a statement that seems even more 
revolutionary: “representation is not the 
original gesture of human soul, but a choice” 
(LÉVY-BRUHL, 1929, p. 567). A choice that 
logic declined according to “our” version had 
and has to make incessantly in the present si-
multaneity of the two different categorical sets 
pertaining to intelligence. They are the result 
of a choice just because, as it is essential to 
stress here, both for us and for inferior societ-
ies the representative logic on which the West 
had based its own history remains always a 
possible option: Lévy-Bruhl claimed that Primi-
tives are organized in a world not regulated 
by concept even if “the possibility of repre-
sentation is not excluded: that for which they 
are actually humans.” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, 
p. 108). Representation is not a prerogative 
of white men, there is no doubt according to 
Lévy-Bruhl that when it may be of advantage 
for them the “Savages” do not hesitate to use 
our own cognitive processes:
like us, when they put a pan full of water on the fire, 
they expect it to warm up and finally to boil. For them, 
as for us, there are, in large numbers, sequences of 
regular events and they count on this regularity as we 
do: their uses and their techniques are a proof of it. If 
however, there is a difference between their mental at-
titude and ours, what is it? This is precisely the question 
that we put to ourselves. (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, p. 37).31
What is the difference and what is there-
fore the law that in this difference supports 
primitive mentality? “Our” logic comes to truly 
understand itself only when it is free to ask 
this same question, when it can get in touch 
with mental habits that do not coincide with 
ours. This happens only if they are not previ-
ously reduced to insignificance, but if they are 
welcomed even if their presence is disturbing, 
emerging as a puzzle that forces us to confess 
a double bottom in our massive categorical uni-
verse. Then “our” logic finds its true essence, 
inasmuch as it is able to  retrace its origins: 
to acknowledge the choice that created it and 
which involves in the alleged clarity of the 
concept the hidden shadow of another model 
of intelligence and ultimately of humanity.
The extraordinary ability of Lévy-Bruhl 
to deepen the paradox of this ambiguity with 
each new publication and to support it oppos-
ing its reduction to a system in an extremely 
complicated balance between representative 
logic and the thousand of real events of the 
daily life of “Savages”; it is based on his intent 
to practice anthropology primarily as a natural 
intensification of philosophy. He had no fear 
to reach conclusions that might prove to be 
useless for the purpose of a “use”32 of anthro-
pology in horizons other than those of pure 
research and, at the same time, which might 
deprive of its foundations the Thomistic-Carte-
sian33 ontology on which rested the philosophi-
cal reflection of that period in France. The aim 
of his researches is in conclusion ontological, 
as pointed out by Levinas in his essay dated 
1957 in which he states that for Lévy-Bruhl’s 
thesis
“the point is not, of course, to return to the same creed 
of the Primitives, but to let emerge structures of the 
mind that make this belief possible and, when all’s said 
and done, ways of being – an ontology – that makes 
similar structures possible (LEVINAS, 1957, p. 558).
Therefore according to Levinas there is an 
ontological core at the heart of the study of 
Lévy-Bruhl, in the direction of a radical con-
testation of Greek ontology and of the differ-
ent results it had produced down the centu-
ries in the history of European philosophy: 
Levinas states that he leads thought to “the 
ruin of  representation” (LEVINAS, 1957, p. 
558). What does it mean? Lévy-Bruhl certainly 
tries to circumscribe una mens, he seeks just 
one eidetic order that could be able to give an 
account of the discontinuity that separates us 
from the mind of the Primitives, but his re-
search is very close to that of Husserl's phe-
nomenology34, which repudiates any explicit 
or implicit idealism. His intention to preserve 
the experience35 of the Primitives without re-
ducing it beforehand in the configuration that 
the observer wants to lay on it, lead him to 
seek evidences, to reason about facts in which 
the difference between mental habits is made 
manifest, thus he can declare:
when I speak without any preliminary critique of 
mental habits different from ours in the Primitives, 
this language implies a parallelism that I have not 
expressly ascertained, and that, put in this way, so 
to speak, a priori, risks to become embarrassing; in 
fact, in this case we will wonder how the mental hab-
its of “Primitives” would then have been deleted to 
make space for others. Uncalled-for  difficulty, as the 
assumption involved in this expression. It would be 
a step forward if, instead of assuming these «primi-
tive» mental habits, you would abandon the idea, at 
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least temporarily in order to examine the facts as far 
as possible without any preconceived idea. (LEVY-
BRUHL, 1998, p. 38).
The concern of viewing in his reflection 
exclusively the original integrity of primitive 
thought, allowed Lévy-Bruhl to oppose the 
ethnocentrism of idealistic origin that Tylor and 
Frazer bequeathed to British anthropology. 
Their theories ascribed the singularity of the 
primitive logic to a malfunction of their minds, 
as if they were children who give a false answer 
that white men knows instead thus preventing 
an authentic encounter with primitive mentali-
ty counteracting its disruptiveness. So we read 
in the La Mentalité primitive:
As long as we assume that their minds are orientated 
like our own, that they react as ours do to the impres-
sions made upon them, we assume, by implication, 
that they should reason and reflect as ours do with 
regard to the phenomena and entities of the known 
world. But we agree that as a matter of fact they nei-
ther reason nor reflect thus, and to explain this ap-
parent anomaly we make use of a number of different 
hypotheses, such as the feebleness and torpidity of 
their minds, their perplexity, childlike ignorance, stu-
pidity, etc., none of which take the facts sufficiently 
into account. Let us abandon this position and rid our 
minds of all preconceived ideas in entering upon an 
objective study on primitive mentality, in the way in 
which it manifests itself in the institutions of uncivi-
lized races or in the collective ideas from which these 
institutions are derived. Then we shall no longer de-
fine the mental activity of primitives beforehand as a 
rudimentary form of our own, and consider it childish 
and almost pathological. On the contrary, it will ap-
pear to be normal under the conditions in which it is 
employed, to be both complex and developed in its 
own way. By ceasing to connect it with a type which 
is not its own, and trying to determine its functioning 
solely according to the manifestations peculiar to it, 
we may hope that our description and analysis of it 
will not misrepresent its nature. (LEVY-BRUHL, 1966, 
p. 18-19).
At the same time, his “phenomenological” 
vocation, allowed Lévy-Bruhl not to stop at the 
revelation in a sociological key of collective 
representations36, shared with Durkheim and 
his school. He instead, in the interdisciplinary 
tradition of his teaching, wished to discover its 
essential meaning and wanted to inscribe the 
collective representation in that question of 
meaning that philosophy asks to the economy 
of human facts without confining itself to a spe-
cific sphere. In this sense, the work of Lévy-
Bruhl marked a truly epistemic break ante lit-
teram in the human sciences just constituted 
as such, but above all it lead the way to a new 
logical formalization37 of the comments provid-
ed by anthropology, that could replace the one 
already made by Greek metaphysics, in which 
circle the activity of Durkheim and his follow-
ers still continued to move. A new logical for-
malization that in the name of the recognition 
through the “absurd” dimension of the Primi-
tives carried out by anthropology knew how to 
advance the issues of a humanity finally open 
to otherness and thus embodied in time, no 
longer forced to give herself up in the purity 
of timeless noesis, where Greek logic still had 
to remain.
5 A THIRD OPTION
Many contemporary philosophers of 
Lévy-Bruhl (Bergson38, Husserl, Rosenzweig, 
Wittgenstein to cite only the most well-known39), 
strived in their investigations to operate the 
same a.m. “ruin of representation”, they 
aimed at being able to question experiential 
data so as to circumscribe the new notion of 
a universal that sheltered an irreducible and 
constitutive historicity. However they were 
unable to compete directly with ethnological 
data according to the philosophical method 
started by Lévy-Bruhl, who devoted decades 
to the examination of testimonies received 
from remote latitudes. We can say that he 
proceeded beyond Husserl phenomenology 
where, as we have seen, he sensed that the 
timeless story of the phenomena of bipresence, 
of metamorphosis, of inseparability between 
totemic animals and members of the clan, 
spells and possessions, this time of the 
Primitives is the only one able to reveal to us 
the hidden nature of the historical time we 
live in. First he tried to grant logic dignity to 
the ambiguity of what we might describe as a 
“universal dynamic”40 in which is finally kept 
the enigmatic face of humanity prior to history, 
so as to advance towards a science of the mind 
in which we can combine the laws of “our” 
logic and those of the other “irrational” logic 
in a dynamic universalisation that constantly 
crosses the human, and of which  “inferior 
societies” were in the eyes of Europeans at the 
beginning of last century the most alarming 
incarnation. 
For all these reasons, he suffered severely 
from the destabilizing effect that his explicit 
double membership provoked both among 
philosophers, who would only consider him an 
anthropologist and among his contemporary 
anthropologists41, the majority of whom, 
like Durkheim, although they were trained 
to philosophy, had chosen not to “transfer” 
the revelations of ethnology, deciding not to 
translate from one language to another. Lévy-
Bruhl from its frontier position sought tirelessly 
interlocutors42, always tried to  explain 
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himself, to question his positions, to accept 
criticism, fully aware of the risky journey he 
had taken and of the audacity of his claim, 
and so nearly labyrinthine in the refinement 
of his precautionary convolutions. But he 
found no adequate compliance, except in very 
few among his colleagues and disciples who 
sincerely admired him43. He was never really 
understood, in an epoch where anthropologists 
were basically asked fast sociopolitical reading 
keys. This difficulty of understanding was from 
the beginning the major obstacle of his work and 
it resulted in the gaps and misunderstandings 
that were handed down while the distinctions 
between the two languages, that of philosophy 
and anthropology were broadening, making 
them strangers as time went by, while Lévy-
Bruhl thought they were to be understood 
together. He had founded no schools and after 
his death the powerful durkheimian school 
took over and decreed the final disappearance 
of the project for which Lévy-Bruhl had worked 
tirelessly: an Ethnology on the field that meets 
the same boosts of meaning that regulated 
twentieth-century philosophy, looking for that 
una mens that tamen never fails to accompany. 
An anthropology project that answers to the 
appeals of a universal “dynamically” declined 
as we already saw and through which we can 
declare fully human in his difference each 
cognitive style that belongs to the human, 
without losing its regulating ideality.
For this reason we think that Lévy-Bruhl’s 
project is of vital importance today: the essen-
tial ambiguity to which his works forces reason 
affects, as we said before, both antithetical 
cognitive paradigms of ethnocentric evolution-
ism, implicit in the durkheimian idealism44 and 
the structuralist relativism, that suggested and 
still suggests in alternative to evolutionism a more 
or less refined juxtaposition between the differ-
ent conceptual universes in which our mind and 
that of the “Savages” arrange themselves without 
searching for a common root in the human. Re-
fusing to choose between one or the other of 
these paradigms, Lévy-Bruhl suggested a third 
option to anthropology because he found in 
both of them the lack of a genuine perception 
of the humanity of the other, which turned in 
the preclusion of the experience of others i.e., 
what will be clearer at the end of this work, of 
what we might call the unconditional surrender 
to his inviolable dignity.
As mentioned above, it was the space 
of a threshold that he attempted to conquer 
with his own critical reflection, on the heated 
ground of the battle of ideas at the turn of two 
centuries in Europe. That space has not yet 
being rediscovered and it might turn to be a 
vital space in the world of human relationships 
were we are currently acting. It could allow, 
after almost a century, the new course of an-
thropology that Lévy-Bruhl wished: if finally 
understood, the difference between mentali-
ties as he genuinely intended it could produce 
an effective transformation in the intellectual 
attitude still very ethnocentric that the “white 
man” has never truly abandoned. Unlike the 
recent past in which he wrote, today “primitive 
mentality” is no longer related to us by tales 
of missionaries and colonial officials, but we 
meet it on sidewalks all over Europe in flesh 
and bones and in the footsteps of men and 
women forced to flee from distant lands of the 
earth. In the schools our children sit next to 
them, and come back to tell us what they eat; 
how they dress and speak, what they believe is 
true. Increasingly often however we fail to ac-
knowledge equal logic dignity to their and our 
truth, so different and so apparently distant in 
the evolution line of civilization.
Evolutionism declined according to the 
Vulgate of Darwinian natural selection is hidden 
well concealed in the xenophobic discourse 
that speaks inside each of us when we feel 
threatened: “we” built civilization, therefore 
our rights weight more than “theirs”, because 
they failed to keep up with the technological de-
velopment the world is living in. Evolutionism so 
understood45 becomes a mental scheme in which 
it is impossible to recognize another in the au-
thenticity of his presence, so much as to make 
irrelevant the reasons of despair that led these 
masses toward us. Irrelevant, insignificant, not 
because injustice in itself is no concern of us 
but, far worse, because to our eyes this injus-
tice is not acknowledged unless as an inevitable 
corollary of the cultural gap that defines “their” 
existence in the evolutionary scale: not true in-
justice then, because suffered by non-humanity 
that ultimately marks each step outdone with 
respect to “us” leader of humanity, that we are 
on top and continue to rise, and that cannot and 
must not constitutively and in this evolutionary 
perspective turn back and take care of them. 
Unfortunately for the human dignity of the 
numerous others that often come from mental 
habits that frighten us because unknown, it does 
not seem that the recent history of anthropol-
ogy was able to offer any instrument of ratio-
nal defense and real use once the researches of 
Lévy-Bruhl were exorcised.
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In what way then could the theoretical po-
sition that Lévy-Bruhl tries to circumscribe in 
his work allow to reject the evolutionary rela-
tivist Weltanschauung that secretly conditions 
our daily relationships and demonstrate in its 
atypical logic the equal dignity of each human 
person regardless of the cognitive performanc-
es he manifests?
6 THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY OF 
 HUMAN LOGIC: simultaneity of participation 
and non-contradiction
In 1928 it appeared in the «Revue Philos-
ophique a text by Henri Wallon, father of the 
children psychology in France. He writes:
Perhaps we use too much, speaking of the Primitives, 
this statement that claims that they would be insensi-
tive to the principle of non-contradiction. If it were re-
ally contradictory or inconsistent, their thought could 
not exist, because thinking is nothing if it does not 
set a relation […]. There is no thought that does not 
postulate a doubling, because at the bottom of every 
thought there is the assertion of a relationship. Since 
the thought of the Primitives is organized, it is neces-
sary that it has certain modes that allow it to double 
itself in front of its immediate and current content. 
(WALLON, 1928, p. 82-109).
In this passage of Wallon, which will become 
later the dialectical nucleus of a specific theory 
on children development46, the teaching of his 
master Lévy-Bruhl echoes distilled in a few 
lines, and in it we can find in a highly effec-
tive synthesis the main points of the new logic 
that Lévy-Bruhl attempted to compose. Trying 
to understand it we will be able to resume and 
explain in a better way what we said so far so 
as to show the reasons of the new opportunity 
that a re-reading of the philosophical and an-
thropological works of Lévy-Bruhl could repre-
sent for the future of human sciences.
Does the principle of non-contradiction live 
in the mind of the Primitives to a different title 
than in the mind of “white adult and civilized 
men”? This is the problem that lies underneath 
Wallon’s declaration. Since their first contacts 
with the “Savages”, ethnographers who came 
from Europe and were acting on site failed to 
provide a unique response and Lévy-Bruhl, 
looking into endless amounts of examining 
reports on the “inferior” people, invented 
the fiercely challenged47 term prelogical to 
describe what appeared to be a mentality 
different by nature from the European one; 
he then preferred the words participation and 
mystic48 and eventually could be replaced by 
affective category of the supernatural in the 
Carnets. All terms comes from his earliest 
studies and aimed at describing the same 
logical dimension of the Primitives which, as 
we already pointed out, according to Durkheim 
is ruled almost exclusively from collective 
representations, and therefore cannot be 
contained in the permanently set standards of 
Cartesian gnoseology for the contact between 
human mind and reality. The ultimate objective 
of Lévy-Bruhl is therefore the gathering of 
the cognitive proprium of those collective 
representations that differ from ours, for the 
purpose of finding again the lost foundation of 
our own logic: primitive mentality, or better as 
he senses the mentality “of those men we call 
very improperly primitive and that are at the 
same time so far and so close.” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 
1966, p. 5). is a witness “in flesh and blood” of 
that foundation and it is not in forgotten places 
of the earth but in the present of each of our 
cognitive processes.
What is then the nature of those collec-
tive representations such as Lévy-Bruhl intend 
them and that we defined with Levinas the “ruin 
of representation”? In Les Fonctions mentales 
Lévy-Bruhl writes that for human beings of the 
inferior societies:
The object is not simply understood by the mind in 
the form of ideas or images; Depending on the cir-
cumstances, terror, hope, sacer horror, the need and 
the intense desire to join in a common essence, the 
appeal addressed to a protecting power are the soul 
of these depictions and make them from time to time 
lovable, fearful, or properly sacred for those who are 
initiated to them […]. This subject […] will never ap-
pear in the form of a colorless and indifferent image. 
(LÉVY-BRUHL, 1970, p. 138).
The “representations” of the Primitives, 
Lévy-Bruhl maintains this term, although by 
that time it is connoted for him by a fully origi-
nal value, foresee in their inside the primacy of 
emotional or dynamic elements which pervade 
them. The participatory dimension constitutes 
the positivity of the experience of reality per-
taining to the primitive human being and, 
therefore, for the latter, the condition of tran-
scendence possibility in the beings he meets. 
Participation is the mystic law that regulates 
the life and death of beings and objects. The 
individual who sticks to the group is deprived 
of autonomy, he has no faculty to decide about 
himself and what surrounds him: the law of 
participation depends on the knowledge, 
typical of “Savages”, and constantly bears 
a mystical influence, having to deal with the 
numerous and powerful spiritual forces con-
tinually active. Therefore mental activity at 
ethnological level does not appear a merely 
intellectual phenomenon. On the contrary what 
belongs to the sphere of concept is unyieldingly 
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mixed with extratheoretical elements and even 
oriented by them: the access to the real cannot 
do without them and occurs through them so 
that “the causal links that constitute the very 
frame of nature, the foundation of its reality and 
its stability, have very little interest in the eyes 
of the Primitives.” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1966, p. 22).
Now, as it is clear from the passage of Wallon, 
which we can now return to, in the hypothesis of 
Lévy-Bruhl, exactly where it underlines the dif-
ference between the mental habits of Primitives 
and our own, the dimension of the principle of 
participatory nature that holds the psychic life 
of inferior societies cannot nevertheless cut out 
the operation of the principle of non-contradic-
tion, as defined by Aristotle's metaphysics. Ac-
cording to Lévy-Bruhl, therefore, faced with the 
Savages we are not confronted by a discontinu-
ity between “our” and “their” logic, but rather, 
owing to the incontrovertible fact that their 
reasoning appears oriented in conformity with 
conditions  which are not “ours”, we are in the 
presence of a discontinuity inside human logic as 
such. According to Lévy-Bruhl, starting from the 
data that the examination of “inferior societies” 
allow us to gather we infer that the possibility 
of human logic to accept formal representation 
comes paradoxically from the same dimension of 
participation. Why can we state this?
We find the answer if we understand what 
Wallon meant and was able to hand down 
to us, one of the few, about the work of the 
master: in the logic of Primitives, according to 
Lévy-Bruhl, the principle of non-contradiction49 
cannot but remain always virtually present 
because, first of all Primitives know inasmuch 
as their direct look on things is mediated, is 
reflected, because it is expressed at any rate 
in a language. This is the meaning of the af-
firmation of Wallon, which resounds with phe-
nomenological echoes, for which “there is no 
thought that does not postulates a doubling”, 
that is not the assertion of a relationship. Lan-
guage, which creates the relationship between 
things and the images of things, and allows 
us to discover their meaning, is what, accord-
ing to Wallon, “doubles” reality into a coherent 
structure, which frames it into a world. This 
process happens as much to “wild” as to “white” 
people, so that all primitive language could be 
translated into any European language of the 
colonizers50. Primitives have therefore clearly 
at hand the inner logic of a conceptual system 
that arranges those notions that seem absurd 
to the European in a verbal universe able to 
express them.
This is a major point in Lévy-Bruhl’s study: 
the evidence of the simultaneity of two laws, 
participatory and representative, in the minds of 
Primitives is given by their words that like ours 
can answer to the principle of non-contradiction, 
even in the dimension of participation, and there-
fore in the end prove to be true or false: despite 
the considerable differences that separate their 
languages from ours the translation is possible 
between two reference codes to a real world.
Unfortunately we cannot deal here with 
the issue of Primitives language as addressed 
by Lévy-Bruhl in fascinating pages: it deserves 
a separate and thoroughly study51. It is there-
fore the presence of the referential structure 
of language, common to every human being, 
that finally establishes the thesis of logic ambi-
guity, that, as we pointed out from the begin-
ning, inhabits the mind of Primitives accord-
ing to Lévy-Bruhl. Consequently they, whilst 
subjected psychically to the rules of a universe 
controlled by collective representation, cannot 
escape the law of non-contradiction, because 
they express themselves in words as we do. 
Now, how can he claim that this same ambigu-
ity lies in the mind of “white men”?
That is the way: Primitives, we already 
saw, do not represent for Lévy-Bruhl the “find” 
of a surpassed stage in the evolution, inexpli-
cably escaped to natural selection, but they 
are the evidence of a cognitive choice that Eu-
ropeans had progressively abandoned as they 
organized themselves in social forms in which 
singularity and independence from the group 
were conquering an increasing value, but that 
is nevertheless innate and does not cease to 
manifest itself in some areas where the law of 
participation had retained its primacy. In 1910 
Lèvy-Bruhl stated about it:
Also in our society the representations and the ties of 
representation dominated by the law of participation 
are far from disappeared. More or less independent, 
more or less manipulated, they exist side by side with 
those who obey the laws of logic. The intellect itself 
tends towards a logical unit and proclaims the need 
of it. But our mental activity is both rational and ir-
rational. Prelogic and Mysticism coexist with logic 
[…]. And if it is true that our mental activity is logical 
and prelogical at the same time, the story of religious 
dogma and   philosophical systems can now lights up 
with a new day. (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1970, p. 454).
Let’s turn again to the essay of Levinas 
dated 1957 in order to clarify this crucial 
thesis of Lévy-Bruhl. Levinas (1957, p. 568) 
writes that:
Human mind does not depends on an external situa-
tion only – climate, race, institution, or even acquired 
mental habits that would distort natural light – but it 
is in itself addiction, that it emerges from an ambiva-
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lent possibility of turning towards conceptual relation-
ships or remaining bound to participation relations.
According to Levinas conceptual relations 
would therefore prove a choice that only 
later on opposes itself to the original data of 
participation relations: you can turn toward 
the concept or linger, remain in the previous 
condition, in the participation relationship. If, 
as we state again, for Primitives the objecti-
fying representation, to which the history of 
philosophy assigned the function of an un-
avoidable medium of knowledge, does not 
guarantee access to reality, if abstractive rep-
resentation is not considered by the psychic 
structure through which the primitive human 
being relates itself to being, this involves a 
fundamental consequence in Lévy-Bruhl, as 
Levinas clears: the vanity of any claim of 
absoluteness in logos. We had already intro-
duced this point, on which Levinas (1957, p. 
557) further continues:
this explosion of categories breaks with that repre-
sentation which founded the whole psychological life 
and with the substance that supported being. The 
analyses of Lévy-Bruhl describe an experience that 
is not cast in those categories, that from Aristotle to 
Kant – and despite nuances – pretended to   influ-
ence experience […] Lévy-Bruhl precisely questions 
the alleged need for these categories for the possi-
bility of experience. He describes an experience that 
makes fun of causality, substance, reciprocity, as of 
space and time, of   those conditions of each “pos-
sible object”.
Now, in order to finally reach the goal we 
had set, we wonder as follows: to what extent 
the discovery of this inherent ambiguity in the 
original frame of human logic detected togeth-
er with Lévy-Bruhl should mean a new wealth 
for anthropology?
7 INDIVIDUALITY AND MYSTICAL 
PARTICIPATION
Let's return for the last time to Wallon’s 
passage to see that in his deepest level we 
found the most surprising novelty announced 
by the work of Lévy-Bruhl: the discovery of a 
differential quality of feeling in the two cog-
nitive paradigms of representative abstraction 
and participation; differential quality destined 
to become along the way of his investiga-
tions a new principle of meaning that, accord-
ing to Wallon, leads us to the bottom of each 
“thought”, understood as “the structure of a 
relation”. To regard every thought as the frame 
of a relationship means discovering its inten-
tional structure, a notion which once again 
in Lévy-Bruhl is extremely close to that of 
Husserl. The affirmation of ambiguity, the nec-
essary overlap between the principle of non-
contradiction, which regulates language, and 
the principle of participation which governs 
collective representations where the Primitives 
are immersed, expresses itself, according to 
Lévy-Bruhl,  in the possibility of a difference 
in mental operations between Primitives and 
“white men” not only at representation level, 
but even more at the originate contact with the 
real,  at that intentionality, which is sensation. 
He declares:
we may even risk to affirm that […] the presence and 
strength of mystical elements in the representation 
makes possible for Primitives, in spite of appearances, 
not to perceive things in our own way. (LÉVY-BRUHL, 
1990, p. 176).
Until the last page of his Carnets Lévy-Bruhl 
attempted to make accessible to its readers 
this result, which has nothing to do with eth-
nocentric claims52. Since thought is in the first 
place a relation structure, intentionality, before 
investigating the difference between the two 
versions of human logic at concept level it is 
necessary to discover that difference already 
at the level of perceptive-cognitive systems of 
thoughtless level, where, according to one or 
the other of the two possible psychic alterna-
tives for human beings, i.e. representation and 
participation, even the cognitive functions of 
sensory content selection would be differently 
declined, of relationship in the original intuition 
of space and time, of comparison, identity [...] 
in other words the cognitive functions that play 
a role in the most basic perception.
To try to understand the value of all this for 
Lévy-Bruhl, we shall examine for example the 
perception of identity, to which that of space 
is directly linked: individual objects that the 
formal logic of representation exhibits as origi-
nal data do not exist in the experience of Prim-
itives described by Lévy-Bruhl, unless inextri-
cably associated with other objects, melted in 
what Levinas in his precious article repeatedly 
cited indicates how a “merge, mysterious and 
inexplicable, of beings that lose and retain their 
identity at the same time.” (LEVINAS, 1957, p. 
561). Lévy-Bruhl (1990, p. 176-177) repeats 
this idea very often: 
Unity, plurality, duality, are not primitive thinking 
categories or usual description of objects having the 
same meaning that we assign to them. We are used 
to an abstract consideration of numbers and their re-
lations. The logic of the opposition between one and 
many is so familiar for us, since our childhood, as 
is the opposition between the identical and the dif-
ferent. Instead primitive mentality […] opposes not, 
as we do, unity to that which is not unity […] many 
primitive languages do not bother to distinguish be-
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tween singular and plural: they are content to do so 
when it seems absolutely necessary.
In the progress of his research Lévy-Bruhl 
comes to change the notion of collective rep-
resentation in this new perspective, which he 
shared with the durkheimnian school: as we just 
pointed out it became so powerful according to 
his analyses to affect even perceptive life, so 
that in the mind of a human being the intensity 
of the dependence from the group one belongs 
to is such that it affects his senses. Levinas again 
commented about it, referring to the objects per-
ceived by the Primitives: “in order to feel them, to 
make them exist, we must already have partici-
pations […] Without participation they wouldn't 
be objects of experience, they would not exist.” 
(LEVINAS, 1957, p. 561). Physical extension 
itself, the outward appearance of space, is actu-
ally a fading to the Primitives: perceived space 
is not given to consciousness if not as mixture 
of objective and affective elements, therefore 
intrinsically involved in a movement, elusive 
and changing, unceasingly pointing towards its 
transformation and so constitutively refractory 
to theme, elusive in the substantial forms that 
allow the detection of causality.
Lévinas again highlights a statement 
made by Lévy-Bruhl about tool making, 
which I think is extremely exhaustive in this 
regard: “what matters most is not that the 
tools are well made, but that they are happy.” 
(LEVINAS, 1957, p. 563)53. The perception of 
space does not occur by means of the detach-
ment of representation because it is not pos-
sible for subjectivity to reach the exteriority 
of physical extent in its authenticity without 
being emotionally tuned with it. It is the view 
of this different understanding of space that 
brings us close to the meaning of the word 
participation: for every human being to exist 
means to share in a force, an essence, a 
mystical reality, that comes to him from the 
surrounding context, and from himself as an 
indivisible fragment of that context. Paradoxi-
cally, the condition of the existence of the in-
dividual, the more essential one, is his sharing 
of the fading away of emotion into the com-
munity, the mystical connection that cancels 
individuality. The anonymity of participation 
produces its major consequences on the sub-
jectivity that relates to it54, and consequently 
on the perception of self, of the personal iden-
tity that everyone experiences55.
Here we come, therefore, in an examination 
of identity and space, to analyze the dimension 
of the personality, which leads us to understand 
more thoroughly the difference in perception 
that separates the two logical paradigms of 
representation and concept. Lévy-Bruhl (1927, 
p. 173-174) writes:
Individuality […] is not, in their eyes, strictly limited. 
Due to membership […] tracks, marks, leftover food, 
clothes, weapons, etc. things that are all truly a part 
of the individual […] the borders of representation of 
individuality remain uncertain, […] compared to them 
our personality seems to have suffered a reduction, a 
kind of shortening.
The idea of personal identity in primitive 
people is very vague according to Lévy-
Bruhl, since community completely absorbs 
the individual: “the human person exists 
through his sharing in the essence of his 
group.” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1927, p. 83). This is a 
fundamental theory of his work, supported by 
evidence that he never tires of showing: due 
to the bond that makes him part of the group, 
the individual does not enjoy a personal 
existence. He writes:
To our eyes an individual, although complex, has this 
one primordial and essential character: to be one; 
otherwise it would not be an individual anymore, but 
rather a mixture of multiple individuals. But among the 
Primitives the acute inner feeling of their own person 
is not accompanied by an equally rigorous concept 
of individuality. Not only the borders of individuality 
remain vague and approximate […]. As the element 
that establishes individuality fails, by linking it to the 
ancestors from which it originates, individuality itself 
could not exist. The individual is not himself unless 
by being at the same time something different from 
himself. Under this new aspect the individual, far from 
being one, is one and manifold: he is, so to speak, an 
actual “place of participation.” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1927, 
p. 228).
What Lévy-Bruhl wishes to emphasize 
most is that the dissolution in the group, there-
fore in the mystical force from ancestors that 
passes on to the individual through the social 
organism, causes in the primitive humanity 
an unbearable feeling of anguish: he dwells 
upon the list of examples which testify the 
original attitude of terror, that marks the re-
lationship between  human being and his con-
stantly threatened life, among the Primitives. 
The immanence of the group in the individual 
causes terrible consequences: infanticide56, for 
example, according to Lévy-Bruhl was widely 
practiced without any remorse for the loss of 
the child, since the infant isn’t part of the group 
until he is initiated into it with a ceremony that 
represents his authentic birth: the guarantee 
of the positivity of the individual in relation to 
the satisfaction of collective needs.
Reflecting on those elements of the life of 
Primitives Lévy-Bruhl drew two conclusions: 
first, there is not in any way between Primitives 
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an innate sense of the value of personal exis-
tence as such, and, secondly, the value of each 
person depends so much from his participation 
in the group that the individual is not born, he 
is not even apprehended as existing until he is 
“fitted” into the mystical life of his society. Par-
ticipation means above all that what matters 
first is the survival of the group: the sacrifice 
of every member in the name of the clan is 
indisputable, and this implies in the same way 
that every member must be determined to 
sacrifice another for the same reason. In a text 
dated 1946 Levinas introduces a theme of his 
phenomenology which owes much to the in-
vestigations of Lévy-Bruhl57, and he maintains, 
fully in tune with the latter, that perception so 
as the Primitives experience it:
is the horror […] like an indefinite menace of space 
itself disengaged from its function of receptacle for 
objects, as a means of access to beings […] Horror 
is somehow a movement which strips consciousness 
of its very “subjectivity”. Not by lulling it into uncon-
sciousness, but throwing it into an impersonal vigi-
lance, a participation, in the sense that Levy-Bruhl 
gives to the word. (LEVINAS, 1986, p. 52-53).
Levinas in this context in which he 
sets up his ethical reflection calls into it the 
notion of mystical participation introduced by 
Lévy-Bruhl, and incidentally he names the 
unconscious, as rarely occurs in his work. 
I think that just tracking the most hidden 
reason of his hinting at the unconscious we 
can finally try to answer, here of course only in 
the form of a quick suggestion, to the question 
we left pending about the intake of new sap 
that the contribution of Lévy-Bruhl might 
offer to anthropology. As regards then the 
new opportunity to define intelligence, that a 
revival of his investigations from the point he 
was forced to leave them may represent for 
anthropology, at a time when it is called more 
than ever to make a final statement on the 
identical humanity of every child who is born, 
in the direction of a more secure foundation of 
human dignity. We believe that the words of 
Levinas just mentioned constitute a valuable 
clue to unearth the “secret” kept for almost a 
century by the work of Lévy-Bruhl.
8 NOT IN LULLING IT INTO  
UNCONSCIOUSNESS
On the trail of this “secret”, we learned how 
Lévy-Bruhl conducted his survey on the differ-
ence between the possible cognitive paradigms 
of the mind to show that this difference involves 
even the perception of ultimate data of iden-
tity, of space precognition, and therefore of our 
single existence. As a consequence we dealt 
with his later broad reflection on the concept 
of person, which in “inferior societies” suffers 
substantial changes that originate in the differ-
ent perceptive nature of the data available to 
the Primitives and that constitutes the plainest 
example of how essential are the implications 
of a categorical heterogeneity that we find ex-
tended to the same sensorial elements from 
which the act of knowledge starts from.
Treading along this path, as we saw, Lévy-
Bruhl moved away from the durkheimian idea 
of culture and society in order to translate 
his anthropology in what could be named a 
phenomenology of primitive mentality, aiming 
at specifying the essential constitution of the 
human, though, as we already argued, this 
was an approach that radically undermined 
the conditions of a philosophy understood 
as pure and mere theoresis58. In 1910, after 
ascertaining the presence of continuous 
conflicts between the needs of enduring 
collective representations and the dictates 
of conceptual logic in the consciousness of 
the “white man”, he exposed in this sense 
the so-called paradoxes of reason: “we must 
definitely interpret in this way the alleged 
conflicts of reason with itself and what is real 
in its antinomies.” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1970, p. 
454). Thence, according to his thesis on the 
“flaws” of our logical reasoning, the issues of 
the law of participation that continue to affect 
our mind of “white men” show themselves. We 
often repeated  in fact that Lévy-Bruhl notices 
the coexistence of two different systems of 
intentionality in the cognitive structure of 
every human being. All this have been recalled 
many times so far, but it is only in this moment 
that we can get closer to the reason why Lévy-
Bruhl sated that, of the two systems, the one 
ruled by participation law is at manifest level 
by the “Primitives” while in civilized societies 
is “simply repressed” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, 
p. 210)59 (Lévy-Bruhl writes precisely that in 
Carnets two months before his death). The 
use of the word repressed, typical of the 
psychoanalytic lexicon, is not fortuitous by 
Lévy-Bruhl, who knew Freud60: he seems to 
be referring precisely to the psychoanalytic 
doctrine. About six months earlier, he wrote 
the following lines in his Carnets:
It is certainly a long time since I spoke of a logic 
other than ours, I restrain myself from saying the law 
or the principle of participation. But the background 
itself of this idea exists without this form: participa-
tion still appears to me as something essential to 
the primitive mentality and probably to the human 
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mind, something that goes together and perhaps acts 
as counterbalance to regulating principles of logical 
thinking. But if this is the case, where does the range 
of participation start and end? How are we to under-
stand that it is something essential to the structure 
of the human mind, which is necessary to the repre-
sentation it makes of objects and beings, and that we 
had to wait till the 20th century to find out its func-
tion? How to understand that neither psychologists 
nor logicals nor metaphysicians like Plato and Male-
branche, who spoke, and very well too, of certain par-
ticipations, did not assigned to it the function inside 
the mind that Les Fonctions mentales acknowledge 
to it. As it seems that participation implies something 
peculiarly rebel to intelligibility, how to understand 
that the human mind is at the same time the principle 
of rationality  and irrationality? (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, 
p. 129-130).
Viewing the almost dramatic doubt of 
Lévy-Bruhl it comes obvious to assume that 
the irrational, that he discovered in the par-
ticipatory experience of Primitives, covers the 
same margins of the dimension that Freud 
probed in mental pathology. Yet the words of 
Levinas quoted above warn us that is not so, 
where he says, as we pointed out, that mys-
tique participation as Lévy-Bruhl described it 
may not coincide with the act of “lulling it into 
unconsciousness”. Why therefore, according 
to Levinas, Lévy-Bruhl did not appealed to the 
psychoanalytic hermeneutical key provided by 
Freud and his school61?
We can measure the distance between 
Freudian Unconscious and the different per-
ceptive experience that Lévy-Bruhl announc-
es as hidden, removed in the mind of every 
“white man”, if we take into consideration the 
assessment that Freud himself gave the to 
experience of mystical participation in 1929. 
He defines the “oceanic feeling”62 by which a 
person tends to dissolve his own identity in a 
whole, as an early stage of the  sentiment of 
the self, and he therefore believes that every 
mystical experience is merely a narcissistic 
revival of some primitive stages of develop-
ment, which originates from the need to deny 
an external danger. The experience of partici-
pation comes from a need, it does not origi-
nate in a logical ambivalence present in our 
minds. Freud's position in relation to logos 
is on the other hand very different from that 
of Lévy-Bruhl: as is well known, the wiener 
psychologist believed that the goal of psycho-
analysis was a successful mediation between 
the universe of passions and the issues of the 
outward world, and this mediation in his view 
is the concern of the rational principle of self, 
since no intuition could give a direction to 
human action, but only  reason in its clarity 
and distinction holds this task. Nothing to do 
with the demystification of Western logic that 
Lévy-Bruhl proposes in his writings. 
No doubt what we called the inherent 
ambiguity of human logic produces, in its 
spreading to cognitive systems of thoughtless 
level, the transformation of the concept 
of “primitive mentality” in a notion that 
apparently looks similar to the Freudian Id, 
since it becomes inherently akin to sensorial 
perception: it happens in feeling and therefore 
to a physical,  bodily, unaware level. But the 
similarity is deceptive. We believe that you 
can dare to affirm that the work of Lévy-
Bruhl sketches the contours of another 
Unconscious63, for which he attempted to 
develop a suitable language, in a long lonely 
undertaking interrupted only by his death, and 
that has very little to do with the Unconscious 
that Psychoanalysis will make familiar to the 
West. Right here, perhaps, you might find 
the greatest contribution of Lévy-Bruhl to the 
development of human and social sciences, 
contribution currently underestimated and we 
could say largely removed.
The Freudian Unconscious, it is crucial to 
see this aspect, is not placed in a linguistic 
universe, albeit sui generis, and therefore 
the dimension of the Id is not, by its very 
nature, subject to ethical evaluation: it is 
precisely unconscious because it does not 
answer, because it is not responsible for 
his actions, it is not included in the verbal 
world where responsibility can occurs. For 
primitive mentality as Lévy-Bruhl intends 
it the opposite is true, since in his opinion 
it is subject to the law of participation, 
but simultaneously to the law of non-
contradiction. He demonstrates in fact, as we 
have shown, since Les Fonctions mentales 
the incontrovertible involvement of the law 
of non-contradiction in primitive mentality: 
verbalization is the natural goal the Primitives 
aim at in every moment of their experience, 
just like “white men”. Although they seem 
drowned into the realm of “absurd”, as we 
heard Mauss define it, Primitives words 
retain indeed their power to transform 
human existence into a real or fake world, 
and this applies to perceptive information as 
well, which, according to the frame of mind 
he defended Freud would have called non-
verbal. Psychoanalysis as Lévy-Bruhl had 
known it did not push this  theory so far as 
to detect in each human cognitive level the 
result of the language that shaped it, and 
maybe it is not yet able to do so today65.
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It is in this distance from Psychoanalysis 
that we can measure Lévy-Bruhl’s daring in 
all its radicalism: in his hypothesis the re-
pressed irrational of primitive mentality is 
not “lulled into unconsciousness”, as stated 
precisely controversially by Levinas against 
Psychoanalysis. It is not “lulled”, silenced, as 
happens to the sphere of extra-verbal instinct 
postulated by Freud because language on the 
contrary in the flow of mystique collective 
representation is the privileged vehicle of the 
law of participation: the words of the group 
originate and support the sense of belonging 
of every initiate66.
Comparisons with psychology, however, 
cannot suffice to clarify the ontological aspect 
that the notion of mystic participation, or what 
we called another unconscious takes in the 
end in Lévy-Bruhl’s anthropological reflection. 
As we stated above, only Levinas was able to 
discern, in his essay dated 1957 that we used 
as privileged guide through this article, the 
subversive67 outcome which, like Husserl’s Phe-
nomenology, the survey of Lévy-Bruhl in the 
perceptive world of the Primitives could mean 
for the understanding of human reason coded 
by Greek metaphysics first and then by that of 
Descartes, which never ceased to provide its 
last foundation to durkheimian sociology. The 
ontological implication of Lévy-Bruhl’s study 
on the “repressed”, the most hidden but full 
of consequences, seems to have had first an 
ethical outcome, that can be only hinted at in 
this article. 
This result marks the direction that a future 
review of the thought of Lévy-Bruhl should 
take: when Lévy-Bruhl describes the participa-
tory dimension of collective representation, of 
that other unconscious of which he explored 
the possibility, he cannot help but deploring68 
the inhuman practices that were depicted so 
numerous in his texts, and this is not a judg-
ment on the value of Primitives, but on the 
effect that primitive mentality has in the mind 
of the individual member of the group. This is 
possible only in the perspective of an uncon-
scious shaped by words: the irrational of primi-
tive mentality encoded in a language, although 
spoken by a group, that dissolves the individ-
ual and that carries out this fading thanks to 
words, paradoxically preserves the possibility 
of choice for every single member through the 
faculty of each speaker of lying69. Faculty who 
does not fade, mysteriously, even in its most 
complete coincidence with the group and that 
paradoxically testifies of its continuous aware-
ness of the relationship that each word bears 
with reality. From this point of view you can 
therefore make an assessment and ethical ap-
plication of what is happening in the sphere of 
passions, in the unconscious, unlike what psy-
choanalysis teaches us. This fact opens a new 
chapter to the idea of human dignity: if in the 
human even the irrational and unconscious life 
descends from a verbal fact, and in conclusion 
this unconscious life depends on a choice that 
the individual makes among his words, then 
the power of the responsibility of that choice 
deepens and gets abysmal. Power of responsi-
bility that the “psychoanalytic” version of the 
unconscious can no longer “lull”. In fact, we 
can only mention it here, it is still Levinas who 
provides the best characterization of the other 
so far unexplored unconscious that Lévy-Bruhl 
tried to define when he was describing the emo-
tional and affective complex of mystical par-
ticipation. In fact according to the French phi-
losopher consciousness necessarily needs the 
power of sleep that the personal unconscious 
grant to it in order to exist: in it therefore we 
can say that consciousness is defined as such. 
The impersonality of mystical participation has 
nothing to do with this “power of sleep”. It 
comes earlier and it well symbolized by con-
trast by the lack of sleep in which, at least, 
the conscience of the individual must cease to 
exist (LEVINAS, 1986, p. 60). The birth of the 
subject, according to Levinas, cannot occur if 
not thanks to sleep, thanks to the detachment 
of a single asleep body from the insomnia of an 
impersonal indefinite. He writes, apparently so 
enigmatic, but what becomes clear in his refer-
ence to Lévy-Bruhl:
The sparking of consciousness […] does not refer at 
all to objective space, the very phenomenon of local-
ization and sleep — which is the uneventful event, the 
inward event. Unconsciousness as sleep is not a new 
life which is enacted beneath life; it is a participation 
in life by non participation, by the elementary act of 
resting. What does sleeping consist in? To sleep is to 
suspend physical and psychic activity. […] The sum-
moning of sleep occurs in the act of lying down. To 
lie down is precisely to limit existence to a place, to 
position. […] Sleep reestablishes a relationship with a 
place qua base. […] Consciousness comes out of rest, 
out of a position, out of this unique relationship with 
a place. (LEVINAS, 1986, p. 63-64).
The non-participation that occurs in the 
act of sleeping means therefore  according to 
Levinas the original choice of coming out from 
the mystical universe where neutral and indif-
ferent space cannot accommodate the unique 
singularity of the human being and from that 
choice, preliminary of every act of conscious-
ness, depends exactly the birth of conscious-
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ness: paradoxically it appears as soon as it is 
possible to sleep. It is not possible to deepen 
Levinassian insightful phenomenological anal-
yses, but using the continued reference  they 
have to the work of Lévy-Bruhl there is always 
a deeper relatioship between ethics as first phi-
losophy and the questions that remained open 
in the Carnets. This appears increasingly clear 
since Levinassian ethics moves from the theo-
retical, anthropological, phenomenological, 
and gnoseological questions that Lévy-Bruhl 
placed along the sphere of irrational participa-
tion, in search of the other unconscious formed 
by collective representation. This issue  re-
sulted already in Lévy-Bruhl’s work  as special 
feature of the sphere of action, of the ethical 
dimension of human in its inalienable value. 
From the study of moral philosophy in particu-
lar, moreover, he began his extraordinary in-
tellectual adventure: the thesis in philosophy 
that he discussed in 1884 had as title The idea 
of responsibility (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1884).
In the same year 1884 the heyday of Eu-
ropean imperialist power was celebrated with 
the beginning of the Berlin Conference, which 
according to  strict criteria shared in the pil-
laging of the colonies and, at the same time, 
prepared the ground for the war that would 
cost the lives of eight million of Europeans and 
opened the way to world war II.
Racial hatred would then explode with all 
its terrible consequences and it would bring 
into the foreground the question of difference 
between mentality. The field of participation, 
peculiar of primitive society would reveal in 
fact a distinctive cognitive category of white 
man: in the rhythm marked by the goose-
step are inexorably collapsed centuries of the 
concept of logic in which Europe identified, 
to give way to the logic of collective repre-
sentation in all its dreadful need of deperson-
alization, demonstrating how the analysis of 
Lévy-Bruhl inhabited the human mind. They 
thus, demystifying the origin of human expe-
rience of the representation, demonstrate the 
fragility of the status of person based on the 
identity of the individual who Europe claimed 
the heritage of his philosophical tradition, 
and claimed the urgency of its re-establish-
ment. In the radical indictment to which he 
subjected the logos of Europeans colonizers, 
Lévy-Bruhl from the early 1900s already es-
tablished all the premises to a statement that 
Levinas, almost a century later, included in 
the preface to the latest edition of Quelques 
réflexions sur la philosophie de l’hitlerisme, 
statement which he delivers to us as the soul 
of his writing in 1934:
The conviction that the source of the bloody barba-
rism of National Socialism lies not in some contin-
gent anomaly within human reasoning, nor in some 
accidental ideological misunderstanding […] the 
conviction that this source stems from the essential 
possibility […] into which we can be led by logic and 
against which Western philosophy had not sufficiently 
insured itself. (LEVINAS, 1934, p. 199-208).70
 NOTAS
1. Hélène Metzger, clever crystallographer and 
chemist, was deported to Auschwitz and died at 
only fifty-five, but her contribution to the his-
tory of science is indispensable: she was an ac-
tive collaborator of the International Centre of 
Synthesis of Henri Berr in Paris; Thomas Kuhn 
celebrates her in The structure of scientific revo-
lutions as basic inspirer together with Alexandre 
Koyré, Emile Meyerson and Annelise Maier. Niece 
of Lévy-Bruhl, at her uncle’s school she proposed 
a new hermeneutics of genesis of scientific theo-
ries, that sprang from an original perspective 
about the role of logic in the progress of science.
2. Lévy-Bruhl considered himself a philosopher till 
the end, and the fidelity to his idea of philoso-
phy as a scientific approach to authenticity of 
human deeds led him consequently to anthro-
pology: “I had the ambition to add something 
to the scientific knowledge of human nature 
using the data of ethnology. My training was 
philosophical, not anthropological: I proceed 
from Spinoza and from Hume, instead of from 
Bastian and from Taylor, if I dare evoke here 
so great names”. (LEVY-BRUHL, 1957, p. 413).
3. Dominique Merllié in the monographic issue 
that the Revue Philosophique dedicated to its 
ancient manager in 1989, reporting some news 
from the biography of Jean Cazeneuve (1963), 
refers that the young Lévy-Bruhl, pianist, for a 
while was doubtful between the university ca-
reer and the conductor one: when he decided 
for the latter, he continued to go to the concerts 
with his score arm in arm (MERLLIÉ, 1989). His 
deep knowledge of French literature and his 
great ability of speaking fluently many languag-
es are perceived in the prose of his books, clear 
and elegant; even Claude Lèvy-Strauss, harshly 
hostile to the anthropological positions of Lévy-
Bruhl, couldn’t celebrate: “an exceptional clear 
spirit  and a charming style enchant he reader 
every moment. A few other specialized works 
show as much fluency and promise as much 
satisfaction. You can still feel in his work, after 
that his first conclusions have been expunged 
by his own solicitation, the charm and the gen-
erosity of his soul.” (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 1945, p. 
540).
4. The founders of sociology and ethnology in 
France, Durkheim and Mauss, come from jewish 
families of Alsace-Lorraine, like Lévy-Bruhl. The 
Hebrew community of this region was the last 
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that decided, in 1792, to take a civic oath, that 
was required from the Republic born from the 
Revolution; from this Hebrew contest of more 
identity awareness came the leading figures 
of what was called “new Marrano movement” 
(MELZI D'ERIL, 1999), that was completely 
achieved in France at the end of the XIX century, 
with the exception of the diplomatic career 
and of high finance of Court of Counts, jobs 
still strictly forbidden. The Hebrews became 
especially well-off bankers and established 
academicians; they lived the same adventure 
of penetration in French society and culture, 
not rarely with marriage alliances, that cement 
the different economic and intellectual capitals 
during the difficult ascent to the recognition of 
equal rights (some examples, Bergson marries 
an heir of Rothschield, Durkheim a Dreyfus 
girl with a very large dowry, Lévy-Bruhl the 
daughter of jeweller Bruhl, for this reason he 
decided to change his surname in Lévy-Bruhl). 
According to an interesting theory of Tobie 
Nathan, ethnopsychiatrist disciple of Georges 
Devereux, in this picture of spectacular 
conquests of Hebrew-French intelligentia, the 
contribution of this one to social science can 
clarify more the whole process of the current 
assimilation; it is particularly illuminating the 
role played in these new subjects by Alsatians, 
among them the feelling of belonging didn’t 
stop to increase because of the waves of 
immigrants from East, that had destabilizing 
results. In an interview in Nouvel Observateur 
in 1981 Claude Lévi-Strauss declared that the 
success of Hebrew minority in Human Science 
depended on the characteristic of absolutely 
novelty of these subjects and on the consequent 
lack of already very well-established university 
dynasties; with all this, according to Tobie 
Nathan, the particular existential situation of its 
founders was able to constitute sociology and 
ethnology as new knowledge, that sprang from 
the inevitable reflection that each of them was 
led to express about their origin from a milieu, 
from a tradition, “primitive” in its irrational 
dependence from religious rituals, whit which 
they had to break in order to be admitted in the 
“civilized” world of science, but they couldn’t do 
without not depending on it in their own inner 
conscience of themselves. The study of cultures 
in their radical alterity should depend, then, on 
a sort of moving, of objectification of the inward 
conflict, that had to tear the personality of the 
famous Hebrew professors at Sorbonne. If it is 
so, all the more reason is important to try to 
establish, here, what is the notion of alterity 
that emerges, in a different meaning from 
that of Durkheim and Mauss, in the work of 
Lévy-Bruhl. [Compare regarding the historical 
question of Hebrew emergency in France in 
those years Christophe Charles (1984, p. 45-
49) e Philippe-E. Landau (2002, p. 91-106)].
5. To begin with 1886 he regularly taught in Paris 
at École libre des sciences politiques, founded by 
his friend Émile Boutmy after the Sedan Battle. 
His famous text is L’Allemagne depuis Leibniz 
(Hachette, Paris), in which he proposed to French 
politicians an alarmed analysis of German nation-
alism. His worries became more and more seri-
ous during the years and his engagement in ar-
ticles on magazines of political study increased.
6. The facts are reported by Merllié (1989), the 
paper appared in the above mentioned mono-
graphic number of Revue Philosophique in 
1989. In the note 86 on p. 446 he quotes the 
passage from a letter written by Lévy-Bruhl to 
Xavier Léon, who was asking him a text for Re-
vue de Méthaphisique et de Morale, in February 
1915. Lévy-Bruhl writes: “I have not a moment 
for me. The Bulletin de l'Alliance Française, 
where I’m working, together a few friends, to 
fight German propaganda against neutral peo-
ple, takes absolutely all my time. The Bulletin 
is published twice a month, in six languages, 
French excluded. Our press run amounts nearly 
to one hundred thousand copies, and the in-
creasing success of this publication asks for all 
the available energy or time we have. We are 
committed to bringing it up to the final conclu-
sion of peace. That is to say that I cannot think 
of writing anything not complying my commit-
ment to this Bulletin”.
7. Frédéric Keck (2008), gives a broad frame-
work of the particular perspective from which 
Lévy-Bruhl intended the “comtian” method and 
theories”, and of the decisive influences that 
such perspective had on the development of his 
anthropology. A separate discussion should be 
addressed to the influence of Hume on Lévy-
Bruhl, but above all it would be necessary to as-
sess the implications of his debt to his teacher, 
Fustel de Coulanges, which so far have been 
dealt with only by Silvia Mancini (1989, p. 63).
8. For instance, Charles Peguy, arch-enemy of 
Durkheim and Mauss sociology and ethnology, 
was however a student of Lévy-Bruhl and, while 
levelling cutting remarks to the new human sci-
ences, never failed on the contrary to reserve 
warm memories for “the great liberality, the 
kindness of spirit, and heart too, of  philosophy 
in the lessons of our teacher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl” 
[Cited by D. Merllié (1989a, p. 494, nota 5). 
See Paul Masson-Oursel (1939)].
9. It emblematically emerges from of the 
thousand of terminological and methodological 
precautions entered in Lévy-Bruhl’s Carnets 
(LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998), the work he worked 
to up to the last day of his life and published 
posthumously in 1949, where, providing a 
rare example of scientific severity, he agrees 
to submit the results of his entire work to the 
critical review of his colleagues to the aim of 
improving the obtained results. However I 
think it is important to note that this sincere 
willingness for the comparison stems from 
what he intended for, since the beginning and 
at a time the superiority of the white race was 
still undisputed, the sense of research: the 
effort to relate to human events, analyzed 
with the utmost respect, without claims to 
systematization, in an attempt to preserve 
the proprium of the studied societies, and to 
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get closer to the facts, as he often loved to 
underline, according to a firm custom of epoché 
very similar to the phenomenological one. He 
write in La Morale et les sciences des moeurs: 
“History and anthropology bring us into the 
presence of an infinitely varied and complex 
reality, and we are compelled to recognize that 
we shall only obtain knowledge of it at the price 
of long, methodical and collective effort; just as 
when it is a question of the nature we perceive 
by our senses. As soon as we consider societies 
differing from that in which everything seems 
clear to us, because everything is familiar to us, 
we meet at every step problems that common 
sense, aided only by the current reflexion on 
and knowledge of “human nature”, is unable to 
solve. The fact which disconcert us doubtless 
obey laws, but what are they? We cannot 
guess. In one sense, social reality presents 
more difficulties as regards scientific research 
then the physical world, for even supposing the 
statical laws to be known, the condition of a 
society at a given moment is only intelligible by 
a knowledge of the evolution of which it is the 
outcome; and how rare are the cases in which 
historical knowledge of the past is sufficiently 
complete and sufficiently certain for nothing 
that is indispensable to be lacking!” (LÉVY-
BRUHL, 1903, p. 68). And in 1927, interviewed 
by a French literary weekly, he condemns the 
ignorance “that makes to misunderstand and 
disregard all what is advanced, sensitive, and 
often appelaing in the languages, arts, and 
institutions of these other parts of mankind” 
mentioned by D. Merllié (1989b, p. 423).
10. “About Levy-Bruhl, Gilson wrote: «In a country 
where many have done well no one has ever 
done better» (Les nouvelles littéraires, 18 mar-
zo 1939)” (SHOOK, 1991, p. 285).
11. Compare G. Jahoda, (2000, p. 218-238) and 
Peterman (2000, p. 405-437).
12. In the english-speaking nations, thank to Ev-
ans-Pritchard studies there are some works 
inspired by Lévy-Bruhl: Rodney Needham 
(1972), and Robin Horton (1973). In english 
is important also the article of Paola Zambelli, 
(1995). In Italy there are an abstract in «Inter-
sezioni», 12, p. 305-409, 1993. In Germany, 
Cassirer looks carefully at Lévy-Bruhl studies in 
his philosophical reflections about myth and in 
his distinction  between logic discursive  and 
creative imagination. See: E. Cassirer (1923).
13. Koyré ascribes to Lévy-Bruhl the merit of hav-
ing preserved the unity of the human mind from 
the attacks of relativism in anthropology, Koyré 
says that “the analysis of Lévy-Bruhl  showed 
such deep well, this formal identity of the cat-
egories of thought”(ZAMBELLI, 1967, p. 22).
14. Noteworthy next to the works cited in Merllié 
and Keck are some works devoted to Lévy-Bruhl 
in years not far from the publications of human 
sciences in Europe. In France Philippe de Lara in 
Ellipses edition looks into the similarity between 
Wittgenstein Evans-Pritchard and Lévy-Bruhl 
in the language of philosophy and in the 
anthropologic field, and he does justice to Lévy-
Bruhl about a lot of issues. P. De Lara (2000; 
2005). In England Cristina Chimisso shows the 
importance of Lévy-Bruhl in the evolution of 
history of science in France. Compare Chimisso 
(2003, 2008). In Italy Ernesto De Martino’s bad 
criticism obstructs the diffusion of Lévy-Bruhl’s 
studies in spite of the interest shown by Cesare 
Pavese in Lévy- Bruhl’s arguments. Nowadays 
to the  beautiful essay of Patrizia Di Palma, 
(DI PALMA, 1983) were added that of  Silvia 
Mancini (1989), of Mariapaola Fimiani (2000), 
and recently of Carlo Prandi (2006). Stanislas 
Deprez (2010a, 2010b).
15. He writes in each single study dedicated to 
Lévy-Bruhl an  example of a real dossier of 
misunderstanding, but in particulary: D. Merllié 
(1989b, 1993).
16. In Italy the situation is not dissimilar to the 
french one as described by Merllié. See for ex-
empple the entry Lévy-Bruhl in the Dizionario 
di Antropologia (FABIETTI; REMOTTI, [19--]).
17. The author even asserts that Lévy-Bruhl collets 
Hegel’s heritage who believed that the African 
continent  was excluded from the history of the 
Spirit because embodying, in his opinion, the 
denial of the human being.
18. For a selected bibliography you can turn to 
Dominique Merllié, (1989, p. 559-588). In the 
same monographic issue on Lévy-Bruhl, Merl-
lié and other authors draw together a profile 
remained till today unmatched of the figure 
and scientific activity of Lévy-Bruhl in his main 
themes. See then the  URL of the website of 
the University of Quebec where, at the section 
“classics of social studies”, the full texts of the 
anthropological works of Lévy-Bruhl are freely 
accessible to all visitors.
19. Just one example among all possible ones, to 
understand how he never failed to show a per-
sonal involvement in the account of ethnologi-
cal facts that he suggested in his books: he 
states regarding the conduct of colonial officials 
towards the inferior societies that “to the mis-
judgment of primitive mentality you have to 
add bad faith and abuse of violence. This chap-
ter in the history of relations between whites 
and Indians is as monotonous as revolting” 
(LÉVY-BRUHL, 1927, p. 123).
20. See in this regard Howard Davie (1997, p. 422-
431).
21. Mauss himself, although honestly taking the dis-
tance from the core of his argument, does not 
hesitate to recognize in his commemoration of 
Lévy-Bruhl's undeniable talent his form of com-
munication: “As for me, what I like best in all 
these books, to which I have often and openly 
opposed, is the beautiful and clear erudition, 
the facts chosen, always instructive, even when 
the examples are pretty, funny, curious, the 
translations are excellent, the numerous and 
happy find, is the plant, the perfect develop-
ment. A beautiful model in French, with a touch 
of English spirit” (MAUSS, 1939, p. 251-253).
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22. What made Lévy-Bruhl so sure of the full 
participation of the Primitives “in human nature”? 
Asked today this question seems nonsense, but 
it was the beginning of the twentieth century in 
Europe, when the propaganda of colonialism, 
even when it was benignly paternalistic, 
painted “the little black”, as defined in Italian, 
as if they were immersed in an underdeveloped 
world. The colonizers related to them as 
“inferior societies”. It was only natural for 
every cultivated European of the time, even if 
generously sympathetic to the inferior societies, 
to infer the low probability of a comparison on 
the same level from the point of view of logic 
and thus ultimately from the human between 
white man and “Savages”. On the contrary 
the title of Lévy-Bruhl “Mental functions in the 
lower society” dated 1910 contained a polemic 
idea addressed to the psychology of the time, 
since his book by its cover already argued that 
the “mental functions” were evidently common 
to white maen as to primitive. It would be very 
important to establish precisely which books, in 
the strictly positivist Comtian learning of Levy-
Bruhl nurtured his conviction and transformed 
it into a position.
23. We take this definition from the philosophy of 
art by Maurice Blanchot, since it seems to us 
to adhere perfectly to the image of human soul 
that Lévy-Bruhl intended to hand down during 
his tireless battles of thought. Blanchot was, 
together with his friend Levinas, pupil of two 
students of Lévy-Bruhl, passionate supporters 
of the master's thesis. Compare infra, p. 14, 
note 39.
24. This is an adaptation of a famous verse from 
the Second Book of Ovid's Metamorphoses: Fa-
cies non omnibus una nec diversa tamen, be-
came proverbial.
25. This is the title of the text of Levy-Bruhl, which 
may have had more polemic resonance in 
France. He was now very famous, but his re-
jection of uncritical adherence to the ideas of 
Durkheim elite made difficult his position as an 
intellectual “dissident” in the ranks of French 
ethnologists. The debate around his work, and 
particularly around the notion of mind as he 
understood it, emerges in the Notice published 
by Armand Colin. Colin was invited to teach at 
the Societé Philosophique in 1923 in the pres-
ence of Lord Ashbourne, Gustave Belot, Paul 
Fauconnet, Xavier Leon, Raymond Lenoir, Mar-
cel Mauss, Dominique Parodi, Henri Pieron and 
Max Weber. In this lesson, followed the reading 
of a letter of Etienne Gilson, who was unable 
to be present. Today his speech is fully down-
loadable from the site <http://www.sofrphilo.
fr/?idPage=34>.
26. As reminded Dominique Merllié (1993, p. 
6), the expression is employed by T. Ribot 
(1870), which was the manifesto of the French 
scientific psychology. Lévy-Bruhl often quoted 
this expression (for example we find it in L. 
Lévy-Bruhl, 1910, p.1-2, and in La morale et la 
science des mœurs (1903, p. 70) and he used 
it during a conference in Oxford in which he 
said: “Our psychology and our logic have done 
admirable progress. They are, as Théodule Ribot 
has noted in the past century, psychology and 
logic "of the white man, adult, civilized”. Has 
the time come for them to enrich and expand 
extending the scope of their research?” (LÉVY-
BRUHL, 1931, p. 25). The expression has come 
into common usage, but it is important to note 
the symbolic value that it meant to Lévy-Bruhl.
27. M. Mauss (1903, 1985); Italian translation by 
F. Zannino (MAUSS, 1965). Mana is a contro-
versial concept that regards the psychic world 
of the Polynesian groups. For Mauss it was a 
category of collective thinking, which indicated 
a positive force transmitted between the differ-
ent members of the group, and based on our 
concept of magic. As regards the meaning of 
“collective life” see below, footnote 45.
28. You can find a great similarity between the 
phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas and 
the work of Lévy-Bruhl. Levinas, student in 
Strasbourg of two students of Lévy-Bruhl, 
Charles Blondel and Maurice Halbwachs, 
repeatedly cites Levy-Bruhl in his texts, 
and in 1957 prepares for the special issue 
commemorating the Revue Philosophique 
the short essay (LEVINAS, 1957), Francesco 
Saverio Nisio (2005, p. 328) writes about this 
essay that “still remains the most penetrating 
interpretive essay of philosophy on Lévy-Bruhl”. 
Jill Robbins (1999, p. 86-88) examines the 
influence of Lévy-Bruhl on the development 
of Levinassian thought, pointing also to his 
philosophy of the image. Later on we will try to 
better define the relationship between the two 
thinkers.
29. In his introduction to the thought of Lévy-Bruhl, 
Levinas notices that the first ideas of Lévy-Bruhl 
had secretly oriented philosophy, and aims 
to demonstrate how. He defines Lévy-Bruhl’s 
philosophy an “intellectualist empiricism” that 
does not recognize, however, the “a priori 
of reason”: the unity of the human mind for 
philosophy is not a given fact, but a task to 
accomplish.
30. Émile Meyerson affirmed the same thing in 
a letter in which he compares the method of 
Levy-Bruhl with the history of science, and 
his testimony converge with that of Hélène 
Metzger. He says about Lévy-Bruhl that “by 
making an intimate knowledge of a «mentality» 
in appearance so different from ours, he allows 
us an entry similar to the penetration of which 
the study of the history of science created the 
starting point. And we also realize that trying to 
use data from two different orders to learn the 
guiding principles of human thought we follow 
similar routes. In fact, if we merely consider the 
historical dimension of each particular acquisi-
tion of science, and if we try, in each case, to 
approach directly the past to the present, we 
are prepared to conclude that those who pre-
ceded us in time reasoned simply wrong. In-
stead we come to convince ourselves that they 
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were thinking exactly as we would have done 
if we had been in their place, if we consider all 
of their points of view and if we compare them 
to the experimental practise at their disposal, 
and if we try to realize how for them, the first 
is connected with the last or in other words, if 
we try to justify their opinions. Conclusion to 
which, moreover, we could have come from the 
beginning if we had considered the difficulty 
to conceive a true evolution of the brain in the 
number of the few generations that separate 
us from our civilized forefathers. So we have to 
force us to think differently than we are used 
to in order to find, beneath the apparent di-
versity of patterns, an essentially identical plot. 
The same goes for what concerns primitive 
thought. Again the explanation that it provides, 
compared with only our own ideas, first appear 
simply erroneous, infantile. But M. Lévy-Bruhl 
did not stop at all to this first impression, and 
convinced that these men should think rea-
sonably, he began to seek the reasons of their 
thoughts, and so he dedicated himself to think 
as they did” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1929, p. 697).
31. In this passage Levy-Bruhl considered himself 
still far from  limiting the question: “If I return 
to the formula of Fonctions mentales dans les 
sociétés inférieures according to which «their 
thinking is not conceptual like ours», I have to 
circumscribe more closely the meaning to be 
given to the word thinking in the same way that 
I had to find a sufficient accuracy for the shap-
ing and use of concepts, considered for usand 
for them. Otherwise, there wouldn’t be univoc-
ity. Their thinking is different from ours, as they 
thought, how their concepts as concepts - al-
though it is true that, in principle, their mind 
form concepts such as ours, and think like us. 
We must therefore groped analysis of the facts 
which allow to grab, below the identity function, 
the differences in the product of this function, 
and, if possible, their causes” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 
1998, p. 228).
32. Many of the theories of primitive mentality made 
in those years in fact respond to the needs of 
justification that colonialism sought for the op-
eration of systematic bleeding of the “inferior 
societies” made by Europeans. Keck shows, in 
the text  we mentioned, the lands administered 
by the French, and it seems significant  the tes-
timony of a colonialist, who reported: “On one 
side, we know that it is critical that the head of 
the cantonal has its indigenous character and 
uses the feudal spirit still in him, on the other 
hand, we are led by the very force of coloniza-
tion to bend him to our administrative mental-
ity” (KECK, 2008, p. 137).
33. It would be very interesting in this regard to 
analyze the great affinity that shows the intent 
of Lévy-Bruhl deconstructive work of Martin 
Heidegger in his Marburg period, up to Sein und 
Zeit. One could hypothesize that the enthusiasm 
of the young Levinas for this depended largely 
by a reading from his previous Lévy-Bruhl's 
thesis.
34. It is now published in Italian for Vittorio De 
Palma (HUSSERL, 2008, p. 75-82). The letter 
from Husserl to Lévy-Bruhl 11 March 1935, 
made famous in the fifties in France by a 
famous course of Maurice Merleau-Ponty at the 
Sorbonne. The father of phenomenology was 
glad to be very close to Levy-Bruhl  theorys 
against psychologism. In this text, in which 
he thanked Levy-Bruhl sending the Mentalité 
primitive, Husserl recognizes the merit of 
having founded a work that should be adopted 
as the model of rigorous anthropology, the first 
evidence of a pure anthropology, since it is able 
to present the Primitives as individuals and not 
as a “psycho-physical objects”, as intended the 
psychologism that Husserl's phenomenology 
was fighting. He presents the investigation of 
Levy-Bruhl as an important stimulus in the 
future of phenomenological research: Lévy-
Bruhl, was able to proceed beyond the a priori 
that consciousness means, towards the origin 
of consciousness itself. Mariapaola Fimiani cites 
this letter to Husserl and says: “The thoughts 
of Lévy-Bruhl clearly suggest, for Husserl, 
the dual path of logical and ontological, and 
converge with the interests of a philosophy 
committed to overcoming the constraints 
of an anthropologism that  is only sterile 
reply of psychologism, and therefore indicate 
that the problems of correlation ourselves-
word invest rather matters of transcendental 
phenomenology concerning different «us as 
possible»” (FIMIANI, 2000, p. 51, note 43).
35. The notion of experience in the latest publi-
cations of Lévy-Bruhl acquires a special value 
which is then used in France by Bataille and 
the Surrealists, in the wake of Freudian psycho-
analysis. Frédéric Keck (2008) outlines the con-
tours in Chapter 4; compare Karsenti (1998, p. 
VII) lingers in his presentation to the Carnets.
36. A passage in the Carnets is very exaustive con-
cerning the definition of collective representa-
tion: “A hand detached from the wrist, i.e. the 
living body is no hand any more; it is a frag-
ment of solid and liquid materials that does not 
deserve such name (Aristoteles). The hand is 
represented and thought of only together with 
the body; it is a part of it but the body can still 
be represented and conceived without it, even 
if maimed. In the same way the member of teh 
clan of the horde, etc. if detached from the so-
cial body he belongs to faces  the same des-
tiny of the mutilated hand: he becomes a mere 
beings capable of moving, feeling, etc. but he 
had lost his essence: he is no more a member 
of the tribe like the cut hand is no longer an 
organ. If we take this consideration seriously 
we find that a great deal of the details in the 
life and thought of the Primitives become sud-
denly clear. First of all the importance or better 
said the need of initiation because without it 
the individual does not enter the group and the 
group would be destined to dissolve itself with-
out initiated people. When death snatches one 
of the members from his living group he has to 
join necessarily the dead group; if this does not 
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happen his existence loses all meaning  again 
like that of the hand cut from the arm. From 
this derives in many primitive societies and 
others the duty of funeral rites. The dead can-
not do without initiation exactly as the living: if 
they are deprived, they are condemned to utter 
dismay and they could be angry with the living 
and therefore dangerous”. (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, 
p. 19-20).
37. According to Keck, (which mentions this issue 
in a speech given in 2004, it is possible to find 
out a development project of new logical for-
malization of Lévy-Bruhl in the work that Emile 
Brehier (1928), his student and successor at 
the Sorbonne and the direction of Revue Phi-
losophique, published on Stoic logic in 1928: La 
théorie de l’incorporel dans l’ancien stoîcisme, 
Vrin, Paris. Lévy-Bruhl had dedicated one of his 
early essays dedicated to Seneca: Quid de Deo 
Seneca senserit, Paris 1884.
38. The relationship between Bergson and Lévy-
Bruhl should be investigated in a specific study.
Bergson openly discusses and criticizes the 
arguments of anthropology in Les deux sources 
de la morale et de la réligion. Bergson's work 
undoubtedly lies on the borders of sociology, and 
the confrontation between the two philosophers 
would be very interesting, since friendship 
between the two never failed. The controversy 
that found them lined up on opposite positions 
focuses in particular on the concept of causality, 
and from this argument  you can deduct all the 
great similarities between their works, but also 
the resistance that Bergson opposed to the 
more radical thesis of Levy-Bruhl. Compare, for 
a special issue of the Revue philosophique of 
1989: P. Soulez (1989), and F. Keck (2008, p. 
170).
39. For a description of the philosophical milieu in 
which Lévy-Bruhl was moving as he opened the 
way towards anthropology in Europe, edited by 
Frederic Worms: AA.VV. 2004.
40. Frédéric Kekc (2008, p. 98, 109-111) uses this 
expression and emphasizes that Lévy-Bruhl 
takes this  to his reinterpretation of Comte’s 
theories.
41. The intervention of Franz Boas (1929, p. 672) 
into the presentation of L’âme primitive’s is 
characteristic, because so many of his detrac-
tors will use the same argumentation;  the 
statement according to which it would not be 
possible to identify a common logic to all the 
“Savages”. After exposing, revealing his doubts 
about  the heart of the reflection of Levy-Bruhl, 
Boas concludes with a critique that shows how 
difficult it was to admit in a work of anthro-
pological research the priority of a universally 
valid essence, although, as we mentioned, un-
derstood in a “dynamic” way. He writes: “On 
the basis of the  experience of my personal re-
lations with primitive peoples, I sum up that we 
are not faced with a simple phenomenon, but 
with a wide variety of conditions that may help 
to explain the attitudes, apparently pre-logical, 
of primitive man”.
42. Merllié, into the special issue of the Revue Phi-
losopique, just mentioned, devotes an essay to 
the relationship between Lévy-Bruhl and Dur-
kheim (1989, p. 493 ss), showing how the latter 
was  mainly suporting the access of Levy-Bruhl 
in the academic world of Paris, and reports the 
break between them since the publication of 
Les fonctions Mentales in 1910. Levy-Bruhl suf-
fered greatly from the hostility of the old friend, 
but his support to the Durkheimian school nev-
er wavered, especially during the war when it 
lost the leadership of Durkheim, overwhelmed, 
up to his death, by the grief for the loss of his 
son André on the Balkan front. Levy-Bruhl in 
later years tried to establish a contact with Ma-
linowski who admired the method of participant 
observation [Compare the letter of Levy-Bruhl 
to Malinowski, cited in F. Kekc (2008, p. 229)].
43. Along with Maurice Leenhard who supported 
his course through the years, Edward Evans-
Pritchard was one of the few anthropological 
colleagues with which Levy-Bruhl had a very 
fruitful dialogue. Evans-Pritchard defended his 
theories in a famous lecture given at Cairo, 
and spread to England. (See in this respect E. 
Evans-Pritchard, 1990).
44. Jean Cazeneuve intended to highlight the de-
tachment of Levy-Bruhl from the evolutionism, 
writing, about his views on the phenomenon 
of religion, that in his opinion: “So there is 
definitely a historical evolution from one term 
to another, because we can find intermediate 
stages, but this development bears a change 
from a mental structure to another one [...] 
the apparent evolution of Lévy-Bruhl relates 
only to the historical phases of the phenom-
enon, and we must find behind this a seem-
ingly structuralist conception”. (CAZENEUVE, 
1965, p. 76). Of the same meaning of Caze-
neuve, of a apparent mixture between evolu-
tionism and structuralism, shunned by both, 
were Emile Brehier (1949), Levy-Bruhl's suc-
cessor at the Sorbonne and at the guidance of 
the Revue Philosophique, and Gerardus Van der 
Leeuw (1928). This strangeness measures the 
distance between Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim, 
who on the contrary, like most sociologists of 
the time, joined the evolutionary model, stat-
ing for example that the existing societies are 
nothing but different combinations of the same 
original society, whose metahistorical truth al-
lows us to class them as if they were its various 
incarnations, and even to determine what these 
are found close to their historical order, already 
provided for in their ideal representation. We 
read, for example, about the difficulty of clas-
sifying a company in an alleged evolutionism: 
“This difficulty is especially peculiar to sociol-
ogy. It scarcely exists in biology. Very rarely, in-
deed, are animal species compelled to take on 
unforeseen forms. The only usual modifications 
they undergo are those occurring regularly in 
each individual, principally due to the effect of 
age. Therefore, the rule is easily established, 
since it can be observed in a great many cases. 
The ordinary condition can be known at each 
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stage of the development of the animal and 
even in periods of crisis, and the same is true 
in sociology for societies belonging to the infe-
rior cultures. Since many of them have already 
completed their cycle of development, the law 
of their normal evolution is (or, at least, can 
be) established. For the highest and most re-
cent societies this law is by definition unknown” 
(Durkheim 1895). “We may, therefore, formu-
late the three following rules: 1. A social fact is 
normal, in relation to a given social type at a 
given phase of its development, when it is pres-
ent in the average society of that species at the 
corresponding phase of its evolution. 2. One 
can check the results of the preceding method 
by showing that the generality of the phenom-
enon is bound up with the general conditions 
of collective life of the social type considered. 
3. This verification is necessary” (Ivi). With a 
view equally distant from that of Levy-Bruhl, 
Mauss said: “Human societies are now living far 
from all of the same nature and evolution of the 
same rank. To treat them so is unfair to those 
who developed the civilization and the meaning 
of the law more fully” (MAUSS, 1969, p. 584).
45. Claude Lévi-Strauss called it the false evolution-
ism, or pseudo-evolutionism, based on an ideo-
logical bias that purports to apply to the world 
of human nature the same laws that should ap-
ply to the organic nature. In Race and History, 
he writes “The biological evolutionism, which 
was founded by Darwin, is based on the obser-
vation of the evolution of humans by means of 
purely genealogical relationships. But this no-
tion doesn’t work for material objects, beliefs or 
social institutions. So the pseudo evolutionism, 
as well as the social or cultural evolution simply 
interprets facts, without any scientific rigor. The 
pseudo-evolutionism has no scientific basis, 
and too often it is confused with the biological 
evolutionism” (LÉVI-STRAUSS, 1952, p. 108).
46. The analysis of Wallon, philosopher and neu-
rologist, marked  the history of twentieth-cen-
tury psychology, anticipating, in many aspects, 
Lacan’s and Winnicott’s. He is famous for his 
controversy with Piaget's about the correct un-
derstanding of the new interpretative keys pro-
vided by Lévy-Bruhl to the study of the mind: 
the Swiss psychologist, looking for the original 
device that regulates reason, declared his debt 
to the work of Levy-Bruhl thinking of clearly 
separating  the various stages of mental devel-
opment of children,  as his theory demanded; 
Wallon on the contrary thought that on the ba-
sis of the results of the reflection of Lévy-Bruhl 
it was possible to recognize in the evolution of 
humans’ cognitive functions a dynamic process 
that knows no separate stages, because in the 
newborn are already present in nuce all the 
mental operations necessary to development, 
in a constitutive mixture. Concerning the ac-
quisition of the ideas of Lévy-Bruhl among the 
French-speaking psychologists it is important 
to compare it with the work of Charles Blondel, 
also a student of Lévy-Bruhl, the first enthusi-
astic populariser of the master, and in particu-
lar C. Blondel (1925, 1926). See also J. Piaget 
(1928, p. 31-60). As regards the position of 
Piaget in the argument with Wallon: J. Piaget 
(1977). The thought of Lévy-Bruhl, even if for-
gotten by the history of anthropology, however, 
has deeply marked the unfolding of European 
culture in the twentieth century: as the history 
and historiography of science, the psychology 
of that time suffered in the same way the bene-
fits of his analysis on the simultaneous continu-
ation of different mentalities, and made them 
their own, especially just in children psychol-
ogy, where the child is now finally considered in 
his cognitive dimension different from the adult 
human being in every aspect, and not just a 
promise of what he will become as he grows up.
47. That is why the mentality of the Primitives can 
be rightly named at the same time pre-logical 
and mystical. These are two aspects of the same 
fundamental property rather than two distinct 
features. This mentality, especially when you 
consider the content of representations will be 
called mystical; pre-logical if we look instead to 
the links. With the word pre-logical we should 
not at all mean that this mentality is a kind of 
stage front, over time, the appearance of logi-
cal thought. Have there ever been groups of 
humans or pre-humans whose collective repre-
sentations never obeyed the laws of logic? We 
ignore it, and in any case it is very unlikely. At 
the very least, the mentality of the society of 
an inferior kind, which I call pre-logic, in the 
absence of a better name, holds nothing for this 
character. It is not anti-logical, but it is not even 
a-logical. Calling it pre-logical I just want to say 
that it does not bother to avoid the contradic-
tion. It obeys, first, the law of participation. 
Thus oriented, it does not rest upon contradic-
tion (that would make it absurd for us regu-
larly), but it does not even undertake to avoid 
it. Absurdity is indifferent for most of the time . 
That is why it is so difficult for us to understand 
it” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1910, p. 106).
48. However, since his early attempts to formulate 
his ideas Lévy-Bruhl actually employed all three 
terms: “The mentality of Primitives, mystical 
beings, is necessarily pre-logical, which means 
that, first of all it deals with the properties  and 
mystical forces of objects and beings;  it con-
ceives the relationship by submitting it to the 
law of participation, without worrying about 
contradictions that a thinking that knows logic 
would no longer tolerate” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1970, 
p. 134). Again, in the Carnets: “In fact, I have 
not used the word «pre-logical» for more than 
twenty years now because it caused me many 
problems. I replaced it with many less com-
promising expressions: «These minds have, in 
certain circumstances, our own need for logic 
- they are oriented differently - they have other 
habits of mind». Apparently, as I used other ex-
pressions, I gradually softened, tempered the 
difference that I had believed to exist between 
primitive mentality and our logical point of view. 
In Les fonctions mentales dans les societés in-
férieures this difference is strong, striking, and 
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repeatedly affirmed; a primitive mentality is 
opposed to the other like essentially different, 
and although I recognize at the same time the 
fundamental identity of structure of all human 
spirits, all capable of thinking, talking, counting, 
etc.., I steadily reproached the contrast that I 
tried to establish between the mental functions 
of Primitives and ours” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1998, p. 
50-51). It seems very interesting to notice what 
Mary Douglas found about it: “Interesting sec-
ondary effects about the thesis of Levy-Bruhl. 
[...] as a technical term the prefix «pre» pre-
supposes a functional prerequisite. The analogy 
is a prerequisite to logical discourse, because 
the logical operations cannot begin only when 
the elements of a syllogism are combined into 
a set of similar terms. In this sense the analogy 
is a precondition of predicate logic, and there-
fore, it is truly pre-logical. [...] Once admitted 
that pre-logical means functionally earlier, the 
term can be used in a neutral way” (DOUGLAS, 
2007, 62).
49. Especially the death. See L. Lévy-Bruhl (1927, 
p. 217, 250-251).
50. See L. Lévy-Bruhl (1970, p. 68).
51. Compare O Quine (1976), Keck (2008, p. 13-
16; p. 228-234) and S. Mancini, (1989, p. 155-
164).
52. See D. Merllié (1993, p. 7).
53. Levinas quotes L. Lévy-Bruhl (1922, p. 350). 
54. Levinas comments: “What we call the I is it-
self submerged by the night, invaded, deper-
sonalized, stifled by it. The disappearance of all 
things and of the I leaves what cannot disap-
pear, the sheer fact of being in which one par-
ticipates whether one wants to or not, without 
having taken the initiative, anonymously. Be-
ing remains, like a field of forces, like a heavy 
atmosphere belonging to no one” (LEVINAS, 
1957, p. 51).
55. Mauss wondered in 1938, during a speech in 
Huxley Memorial Lecture: “Who know even 
wheter if this «category» wich all of us here 
believe to be well founded will always be rec-
ognised as such? It is formulated only for us, 
among us.  Even its moral strenght – the sacred 
character of the human person – is questioned, 
not only throughout the Orient wuch has not yet 
attained the level of our sciences, but even in 
countries where this principle was discovered. 
We have great possessions to defend. Whit us 
the Idea could disappear (MAUSS, 1999, 381).
56. See more L. Lévy-Bruhl (1927, p. 236-239).
57. It refers to the “il y a”, topic unavoidable to the 
understanding of the  Levinassian ethics, and 
introduced to be precise, in one of his early sto-
ries, Le ressasement eternel, by Maurice Blan-
chot.
58. Meaningful in such sense is the cut that he gave 
to his lectures on the philosophy of Descartes, 
already decidedly breaking with the tradition 
of Cartesian metaphysics: it is famous the 
course about Cartesio that Gilson, from his 
notes of student, reported almost entirely on 
the first monographic number of the «Revue 
Philosophique» dedicated to Lévy-Bruhl in the 
centenary of his birth: E. Gilson (1957, p. 432). 
The well-known essay by Antonio Damasio 
(1994), we can say at this point follows in the 
footsteps of Lévy-Bruhl in his deconstruction 
of the metaphysics of Descartes, bringing the 
support of neuroscience.
59. So Merllié comments: “A parallel is imposed. We 
can consider that Freud has made another part 
of the program outlined by Ribot explaining the 
«logic» of psychopathological behaviors, and 
showing that they clarify «the normal» ones. 
If the resistances to the psychoanalysis have 
been lively, they seem outdated since the work 
of Freud has established itself in a completely 
different way from that of Lévy-Bruhl. Such dif-
ference of destiny may be partially explained, no 
doubt, by the fact that Freud has surrounded his 
work of a conceptual framework, reworked sev-
eral times, such cumbersome to make it looking 
as a highly theoretical or esoteric work. While 
Lévy-Bruhl has more rather tried to cancel, or 
present only to a sketch, the notional building 
that seemed necessary to stage the analyses 
and documents intended to convey his message. 
He has thus provided a work looking exoteric, 
therefore, more difficult to defend on the part 
of experts or priests, or against transpositions 
or popularizations. Still, the one acted as the 
founder of a school, which was not in the tem-
perament of the other” (MERLLIÉ, 1993, p.  7-8). 
According to Merllié, Lévy-Bruhl was fully aware 
of the similarities that existed between his work 
and Psychoanalysis, and this is demonstrated 
by the topics and the language of the Mentalité 
primitive (MERLLIÉ, 1993, p. 7, note 27).
60. They met in Vienna in 1935: during a confer-
ence of Lévy-Bruhl in Vienna Freud invited him 
to his house to thank him for sending the La 
Mentalité primitive.
61. Robert Segal draws a parallel between the 
work of Jung and Lévy-Bruhl in that of R. Segal 
(2007), proposing unfortunately the persistent 
misunderstanding of the theory of Lévy-Bruhl, 
but in his analysis, however, clearly shows the 
incompatibility between the two models for de-
coding the unconscious.
62. We refer to the work of Freud (1985). He writes 
on pages 200-201: “So it is a feeling of indis-
soluble connection, of belonging inseparably to 
the external world as a whole. To me, person-
ally, I may remark, this seems something more 
in the nature of an intellectual judgment, not. 
It is true, without any accompanying feeling-
tone, but with one of a kind which characterizes 
other equally far-reaching reflections as well. I 
could not in my own person convince myself of 
the primary nature of such a feeling. But I can-
not on that account deny that it in fact occurs 
in other people. One can only wonder whether 
it has been correctly interpreted and whether 
it is entitled to be acknowledged as the fons 
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et origo of the whole need for religion. I have 
nothing to suggest which could effectively set-
tle the solution of this problem. The idea that 
man should receive intimation of his connec-
tion with the surrounding world by a direct feel-
ing which aims from the outset at serving this 
purpose sounds so strange and is so incongru-
ous with the structure of our psychology that 
one is justified in attempting a psycho-analytic, 
that is, genetic explanation of such a feeling. 
Whereupon the following lines of thought pres-
ent themselves. Normally there is nothing we 
are more certain of than the feeling of our self, 
our own ego. It seems to us an independent 
unitary thing, sharply outlined against every-
thing else. That this is a deceptive appearance, 
and that on the contrary the ego extends in-
wards without any sharp delimitation, into an 
unconscious mental entity which we call the id 
and to which it forms a facade, was first dis-
covered by psycho-analytic research, and the 
latter still has much to tell us about the rela-
tions of the ego to the id. But towards the outer 
world, at any rate, the ego seems to keep it-
self clearly and sharply outlined and delimited. 
There is only one state of mind in which it fails 
to do this.—an unusual state, it is true, but not 
one that can be judged as pathological. At its 
height, the state of being in love threatens to 
obliterate the boundaries between ego and ob-
ject. Against all the evidence of his senses, the 
man in love declares that he and his beloved 
are one, and is prepared to behave as if it were 
a fact”. It is interesting to estimate the distance 
between the position of Lévy-Bruhl and Freud 
on the unconscious, by comparing the last lines 
of the passage of Freud's thesis that the young 
Levinas argued in those same years in his fa-
mous introduction to Husserl's phenomenolo-
gy: “the acte of love has a sense, but this does 
not mean that it includes a representation of 
the object loved togheter with a purely subjec-
tive feeling wich has no sense and wich accom-
panies the representation. The charateristic of 
the loved object is precisely to be given in a 
love intention, an intention wich is irreducibile 
to a purely theoretical representation” (LEVI-
NAS, 1930, p. 75, 1995, p. 44-45). Levinas in 
the moment he published this statement was 
certainly by now student of Husserl but as we 
have seen already well aware, because of his 
studies, of the theses of Lévy-Bruhl: at the end 
of this work it should be clear that Levy-Bruhl 
himself could not but subscribe the Levinasian 
perspective, and we would move us to say that 
this has always implicitly underlies the argu-
ments of the Mentalité primitive, received in 
their authenticity. That is why the divergence 
found in the same field between the phenom-
enology announced by Levinas and Freud's ra-
tionalism can once again concurs to appreciate 
the extraordinary closeness of the positions of 
Lévy-Bruhl to phenomenology, in his transcen-
dental turning point: contiguity that deserves 
closer scrutiny.
63. Karsenti seems to predict somehow this same 
assumption when investigating the partecipation 
du dedans describing it as “the ultimate need” 
of thought, Lévy-Bruhl in Carnets (KARSENTI, 
1998, p. XXXVI).
64. You might find a happy correspondence be-
tween Lévy-Bruhl's position and that of Lev 
Vigotskij, who in those same years, was pro-
posing the hypothesis of the word as “perfor-
matrice of thought”. Also according to Vigotskij 
we should not give our intelligence processes 
that words have already come. First of all see 
L. Vigotskij (2007).
65. The Jungian explicitly rejected, since the thirties 
of last century, the research findings of Levy-
Bruhl, considering him too guilty for having 
too much clearly separated the “two logics”. 
See in this regard C. R. Aldrich (1949). As for 
the ancestry of Kleinian psychoanalysts, the 
existence of a “structural unconscious” in the 
Freud of the first topic, that does not coincide 
tout court with the repressed unconscious, was 
taken from 1975 by Matte Blanco as the most 
authentic discovery of Psychoanalysis, and 
it could perhaps be an element of continuity 
between the ideas of Freud and those of Levy-
Bruhl. The work of Matte Blanco, moreover, 
seems to take up the legacy of the thought of 
Levy-Bruhl  by postulating the existence of a bi-
logic in human thought. Compare Ignacio Matte 
Blanco (2000).
66. In the Fonctions mentales Lévy-Bruhl dwells at 
length on the language  description of Primi-
tives and it detects “the mystical character that 
it inevitably plays in lower societies [...] and 
this power belongs not only to proper nouns, 
but to all terms, whatever they may be [...] 
it follows that the use of words cannot be in-
different: the mere fact of pronouncing them 
[...] may establish or destroy important and 
fearsome presences. There's a magic action in 
the word, therefore precautions are necessary, 
which will be reflected in the creation of lan-
guage reserved for certain occasions or certain 
categories of persons” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 1970, p. 
217-218). The text proceeds to list the specific 
instances where this happens, and is of very 
great interest in relation to the definition of the 
power of language to give rise to collective rep-
resentations, which then decide the existence 
of each member. The subsequent discussion of 
Lévy-Bruhl on the myth starts from language 
samples and magical rituals narrated in these 
pages.
67. How much impact has Lévy-Bruhl’s ontology 
of participation on the levinassian transition to 
the Autrement qu’être? In Italy only Francesco 
Paolo Ciglia devoted large space to this issue. 
See first F. P. Ciglia (1982, 1985, 1996).
68. Lévy-Bruhl usually chooses to “appear” in the 
introduction only and directly at the conclusion 
of his essays, and merely to comment laconi-
cally the reported events , speaking only of the 
choice and sequence of episodes, and he fits 
some adjectives into the key points. Some-
times, however, he cannot avoid commenting 
on the reports listed and this allows us to dis-
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cover his intense involvement in everything 
he writes. For instance, among the many pos-
sible examples, about the widespread practice 
of murdering the widow after her husband's 
death, he writes at the end of his argument: 
“These sometimes frightening prohibitions and 
obligations forced on widows find their own 
explanation. They are supposed to treat them 
[the widows] exactly in the same way as their 
husband’s belongings; they should be sen-
tenced death but generally you let them live, 
but in the worst conditions” (LÉVY-BRUHL, 
1990, p. 291).
69. Regarding the danger of lying in primitive soci-
ety, Lévy-Bruhl gives this testimony: “If a man 
has the habit of lying, and someone puts on 
his hat, distraction can contract the infection 
of lies ... the same goes for shoes … Once I 
had a maid from Namhsan Palong , she was 
coming with me in Burma. A servant in Bur-
ma, on a rainy day, borrowed for five minutes, 
without permission, the sandals of my Palong. 
I never saw a woman seized by so much fury 
[...] the tears flowed down her cheeks and  she 
told me that the sandals were new, but she 
would never wore them anymore: she feared 
that the defects of the bad liar Burmese servant 
would  passed on to her” (L. Lévy-Bruhl, L’âme 
primitive, cited Italian translation, p. 136). Re-
flection on lie was occupying a major position 
in the philosophy of language of Europe ansd 
America during the life of  Lévy-Bruhl, as well 
as in the French philosophy of that period, and 
Freud and his school could not do without it. 
This is a huge topic for which volumes of spe-
cific analyses would not be enough. Here we 
only cite, to clarify the position of Lévy-Bruhl, 
the text by Alexandre Koyré clearly inspired by 
him in developing its valuable analysis of secret 
societies and totalitarianism. Koyré says: “Each 
secret group is either a doctrinal or a action 
group, a sect or a conspiracy – and the bound-
ary between the two types is very difficult to 
trace […] it is a group that has a secret, or rath-
er that owns secrets. We wish to say that, even 
when it is a pure action group, as a gang of 
gangsters or a palace conspiracy that does not 
possess a secret and esoteric doctrine, which 
is required to safeguard the mystery from the 
eyes of the uninitiated; even in this case, its 
existence is inextricably linked to the mainte-
nance of a secret, and even a double secret, the 
secret of their existence as well as the purpose 
of its action”. (KOYRÉ, 2010, p. 12) This is what 
happens in every “inferior society” in which 
the collective representation of single thought 
prevails: the survival of the group is guaranted 
first and foremost by words. Yet language in 
its very essence acknowledge the possibility of 
lying, as history of philosophy teaches and as 
does Koyré in the opening of its work. There-
fore paradoxically there is an innate way-out 
from the existence of the totalitarianism of col-
lective representation and it assures to the indi-
vidual, at any time, the possibility of regaining 
his singular identity.
70. E. Levinas (1934) (since 1997 it was avail-
able by Rivages’ editions, it is added to Miguel 
Abensour’s essay); Italian translation by A. 
Cavalletti, Alcune riflessioni sulla filosofia 
dell’hitlerismo, (LEVINAS, 1996, p. 21). As we 
tried to reconstruct  in this work, we think that 
the difference between the mentality according 
to Lévy-Bruhl’s hypothesis is extremely con-
genial to the persuasion of Levinas whereby 
“the authentically human is the Jewish being 
of every man” (LEVINAS, 1988, 2000, p. 192), 
because the monotheism of Israel is the only 
guarantee that sheltered humanity from itself. 
Levinas adds, with amused irony: “do not be 
frightened” (LEVINAS, 1988, 2000, p. 192).
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